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POETRY IN MOTION: 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
AND FORWARD PROGRESS AS AN IMPERATIVE 
DANIEL J. CAPRA & LIESA L. RICHTER 
“Without continual growth and progress, such words as improvement, 
achievement, and success have no meaning.”—Benjamin Franklin 
ABSTRACT 
This Article dives into the long-standing debate about the propriety of altering 
the time-honored Federal Rules of Evidence. Noted authorities, such as the late 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, have eschewed any modification to the Rules, claiming 
that they must remain essentially fixed in their original form to maximize their 
utility to trial advocates and to avoid wasteful dislocation costs that accompany 
updates. Unlike the many scholarly works examining the merits and demerits of 
particular evidence rules, this Article shines a light on the lesser examined 
process of amending the Federal Rules of Evidence, revealing a taxonomy of 
evidentiary circumstances or trigger points that justify and, indeed, demand a 
change to the Rules. It demonstrates that amendments are imperative when the 
Rules may be subject to an unconstitutional application as written; when the 
Rules are plagued by irreconcilable conflicts in their interpretation and 
application among circuits; when tectonic shifts in technology, trial practice, or 
society render the Rules obsolete, unfair, or ill-equipped for the task they were 
designed to perform, and when amendments will enhance the simplicity and 
brevity of the Rules and make them easier for judges and litigants to deploy.  
Rather than debating the risks inherent in rule changes generally, rulemakers 
can utilize this taxonomy to distinguish a necessary amendment from wasteful 
tinkering. To illustrate these trigger points, the Article highlights recent and 
 
 Philip Reed Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Reporter to the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. All views expressed in this Article are those of the 
authors and do not represent the official views of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. 
Our sincere appreciation goes to Krista Staropoli, J.D., N.Y.U., 2019, for her invaluable 
research support. We are also grateful to Professors Howie Erichson, Bruce Green, Michael 
M. Martin, Steve Thel, Ian Weinstein, and Ben Zipursky for their very helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this Article. 
 William J. Alley Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law; Academic 
Consultant to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. 
  
1874 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1873 
 
pending amendment proposals and analyzes the amendment process for the 
Federal Rules of Evidence since 1992, when the Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules was reconstituted.  Further, the Article acknowledges the 
barriers to progress that exist even in these contexts, exploring the deference 
owed to congressional compromises embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the impact of Supreme Court precedent interpreting existing Rules, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s role in the rulemaking process. Finally, the Article 
highlights some of the most fundamental principles and practices that may be 
employed to overcome these barriers and to craft optimal amendments to the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist was known to say of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence that they should rarely, if ever, be altered.1 In counseling against 
efforts to polish the Rules to perfection, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave voice to a 
valid and enduring principle: the Federal Rules of Evidence are purposely 
concise and were designed to be nimble. Practitioners can commit them to 
memory for instant deployment in the quick-draw contest that traditionally has 
been the American trial. Think seasoned trial titans like Clarence Darrow cross-
examining William Jennings Bryan in the groundbreaking Scopes case in the hot 
Tennessee summer of 1925.2 Excessive tinkering with evidence rules would 
impose significant dislocation costs on both judges and courtroom advocates, 
who would be required to adapt constantly and to expend resources litigating 
new language injected into long-standing evidentiary doctrines. Incessant 
amendments would also raise the specter of unintended consequences, 
disrupting the settled operation of the Rules around them. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s admonition was rooted in these traditional assumptions about the 
use of the Evidence Rules and in the inefficiencies that imprudent and excessive 
reform efforts would generate.3 
But the rigid rejection of efforts to modify the Rules also poses significant 
risks to the trial process. Reform is an important ingredient in any healthy body 
of rules and the Federal Rules of Evidence must continue to evolve to retain their 
utility and contemporary viability. Allowing the Rules to become fixed in their 
1975 iteration threatens to undermine the goals of uniformity, fairness, and 
simplicity that they were designed to foster. Amendments to the Evidence Rules 
are thus imperative to protect the uniformity the Rules were designed to achieve, 
to ensure the contemporary relevance of evidentiary standards enacted in 1975, 
to resolve ambiguities, and even to prevent genuine injustice. Not every 
amendment designed to achieve these goals will thwart the settled expectations 
of experienced trial lawyers. When drafted carefully and vetted thoroughly, 
amendments to the Evidence Rules should make them clearer and easier to apply 
than their ancestors. By resolving conflicts in the case law, amendments can 
reduce the costs inherent in applying the Rules in individual cases. 
 
1 See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending 
to the Past and Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 829 (2002) (“The Chief 
Justice has made it clear to new chairpersons that he does not want the Committee to engage 
in law reform . . . .”); Paul R. Rice, Back to the Future with Privileges Abandon Codification, 
Not the Common Law, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 739, 754-55 (2004) (“Chief Justice Rehnquist 
has given clear instructions to all of the chairpersons he has appointed that revisions should 
be minimal—only those necessary to correct pressing problems.”). 
2 See Edward J. Larson, The Scopes Trial and the Evolving Concept of Freedom, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 503, 519 (1999). 
3 See Symposium, The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 739 
(2002) (noting that evidence rulemaking is “inherently conservative” and “resistant to 
change”). 
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Furthermore, the traditional assumptions about applying the Rules of 
Evidence “on the fly” may be somewhat anachronistic in the world of 
contemporary litigation. The phenomenon of the vanishing trial has been widely 
reported.4 Given the paucity of trials, evidence rules are far more often applied 
in the context of summary judgment and as part of the compromise of civil and 
criminal cases than they are in the courtroom. Even in the trial context, 
significant evidentiary issues—such as the admissibility of “other crimes” 
evidence, the admissibility of prior convictions, and the admissibility of expert 
opinion testimony—are frequently presented before trial in in limine motions. 
Judges and lawyers can and should consult the rule book for updates in these 
situations in which the Rules are not being applied “in the heat of battle.” 
Allowing any set of rules, even trial rules like the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
to calcify and become frozen in place presents a grave danger to their efficacy 
and fairness. Indeed, this risk became apparent after the Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules was disbanded following the enactment of the Rules in 1975. 
With no body tasked with oversight of the Rules and with no ready mechanism 
for modification, commentators grew increasingly concerned about the 
conflicting interpretations in the courts and about the Rules’ long-term viability.5 
Amid calls for reform, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules was 
reconstituted in 1992 to oversee amendments to the Rules to avoid such a stale 
state of affairs.6 
Change is notoriously hard and potentially risky, but it is sometimes 
necessary. Responsible oversight of the Federal Rules of Evidence thus demands 
that rulemakers balance the competing considerations of disruptive dislocation 
costs potentially lurking within certain reform proposals and the need for 
continuing constructive improvement and advancement of evidentiary 
standards. 
Unlike the many scholarly works examining the merits and demerits of 
particular evidence rules, this Article shines a light on the lesser-examined 
theoretical underpinnings of rulemaking in the context of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, offering insights into the principles and practices that ensure a proper 
balance of these competing considerations. It reveals the often hidden factors 
 
4 See generally, e.g., AD HOC COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL TRIAL, AM. COLL. OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS, THE “VANISHING TRIAL:” THE COLLEGE, THE PROFESSION, THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (2004), reprinted in 226 F.R.D. 414 (2005) (noting that civil justice system has 
experienced “litigation explosion and trial implosion” over past four decades). 
5 See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen 
Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 857, 862 (1992) (advocating for reconstituted Advisory Committee on Evidence 
Rules to propose amendments to address court splits on meaning of many Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
6 See Judicial Conference of the United States: Committees (Chronological), FED. JUD. 
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/administration/judicial-conference-united-states-committe 
es-chronological [https://perma.cc/CN7V-PCME] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
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that inform amendment proposals of many stripes and offers an insider’s 
perspective on the mechanics, substance, and politics that inform rulemaking. In 
particular, this Article evaluates the rulemaking process since 1992, when the 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules was reconstituted. The lessons learned 
from that history can and should be applied to achieve optimal future 
rulemaking, not just for the Evidence Rules, but for all rules of procedure. 
This Article will identify and examine the factors that animate sound 
evidentiary rulemaking in three parts. Part I will explore the trigger points 
sufficient to overcome concerns like those articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and that warrant amendments to the Rules. Moreover, Part I offers rulemakers a 
helpful taxonomy of evidentiary circumstances that they may utilize to 
distinguish needed amendments from wasteful tinkering. When these 
circumstances are present, the transaction costs inherent in rule changes become 
justified. Utilizing recent and pending amendments as examples, Part I 
illustrates when modifications to the Rules are necessary to address 
constitutional concerns, to resolve conflicts in federal precedent, to ensure the 
currency and contemporary relevance of the Rules, and to rectify irrational or 
needlessly complex evidentiary standards. Part II acknowledges the barriers to 
progress that exist even in these contexts and explores the deference owed to 
congressional compromises embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well 
as the impact on the amendment process of Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting existing Rules. Part II also examines the role of the U.S. Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) in the rulemaking process and the effect the DOJ can have 
on proposed amendments. Finally, Part III highlights some of the most 
fundamental principles and practices that rulemakers may employ to overcome 
these barriers and to craft optimal amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.7 Adhering to these principles and practices allows rulemakers to 
maintain the integrity of the Federal Rules of Evidence while steering clear of 
the wasteful dislocation costs that Chief Justice Rehnquist feared. 
I. A CHANGE WILL DO YOU GOOD: 
WHEN AN AMENDMENT IS WARRANTED 
The perfect is often the enemy of the good. And efforts to perfect the Federal 
Rules of Evidence through endless amendments may do more harm than good. 
To take but one example: it makes little sense that the Rule 803 hearsay 
exceptions are styled as number after number, such as Rule 803(1), when other 
 
7 Although this Article explores some of the most fundamental mechanisms used to 
develop optimal amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, it does not identify all 
principles that have proved valuable. For example, reliance on state evidentiary practices can 
be very helpful in crafting solutions to federal evidentiary problems. A full exploration of the 
role of the states as laboratories for alternative evidence provisions is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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Rules combine numbers and letters to demarcate subsections clearly.8 Still, this 
numbering is not substantive and is not causing confusion for lawyers or judges 
using the Rule. And to “fix” the numbering would seriously disrupt electronic 
research into the Rule 803 exceptions. The Advisory Committee is therefore 
wise to leave such problems well enough alone.9 
There are other, more foundational irregularities in the operation of the Rules 
that cannot be ignored, however. When the Evidence Rules are subject to 
unconstitutional application, when the federal courts are split as to their proper 
interpretation, or when old rules are ill-suited to contemporary litigation or are 
needlessly complex, amendments should be pursued. 
A. The Elephant in the Room: Drafting in the Shadow of the Constitution 
The Federal Rules of Evidence are designed to govern the admissibility of an 
array of potential information that may be offered into evidence in a wide variety 
of cases. These Rules operate independently of the U.S. Constitution, which may 
also require the admission or exclusion of certain evidence based upon rights 
and principles that the Bill of Rights articulates.10 Perhaps the clearest 
circumstance in which the Evidence Rules should be amended occurs when the 
Supreme Court has specifically determined that a particular rule is subject to 
unconstitutional application.  
Allowing a Rule to remain on the books that may violate a litigant’s 
constitutional rights when applied as written undermines the goal of the 
Evidence Rules to ascertain truth and secure just determinations.11 Further, 
retaining rule text that is capable of unconstitutional application plants a trap for 
the unwary within the body of the Rules. Especially when lawyers apply the 
Rules in their most traditional sense—in the heat of trial—they may not consider 
the need to consult constitutional doctrine. A lawyer may justifiably presume 
 
8 Compare FED. R. EVID. 803 (utilizing numbers to denote subsections), with FED. R. EVID. 
801, and FED. R. EVID. 804 (utilizing letters to denote subsections). 
9 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 23-24, 2009, 
at 11 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of April 23-24, 2009], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/fr_import/EV04-2009-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/34D6-ZVBG] (noting Committee 
rejection of proposal to alter number after number structure of Rule 803 “because it would 
disrupt electronic searches and impose transaction costs that far outweighed any benefit”). 
10 See generally Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (protecting criminal 
defendants’ constitutional right to fair trial under Sixth Amendment by mandating admission 
of post-verdict juror testimony regarding racially discriminatory statements affecting juror 
deliberations); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (barring evidence rules that 
unreasonably prevent criminal defendants from presenting materially exculpatory evidence); 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (prohibiting admission of testimonial statements 
against accused unless declarant is unavailable and defendant has had prior opportunity to 
cross-examine pursuant to Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause). 
11 FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer every 
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of 
evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”). 
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that applying the provision as written could pose no danger of constitutional 
error. Therefore, it is critical to change the Federal Rules of Evidence to reflect 
evolving constitutional doctrine.12 
When the potential for unconstitutional application of the Rules rears its head, 
concluding that an amendment is needed may be the only straightforward part 
of the analysis. The more difficult question is how the rules should accommodate 
constitutional limitations. Adding to an evidence rule language that tracks the 
precise factual scenario presented by a relevant Supreme Court opinion may 
prove too narrow to capture the full panoply of constitutional risks, resulting in 
a rule that may need to be modified again to account for emerging doctrine. And 
fact-specific rules may become verbose and unwieldy. 
The 1994 amendment to the rape shield provision in Federal Rule of Evidence 
412 offers an example of an ideal solution to this constitutional conundrum. Rule 
412 limits evidence of a victim’s sexual history or predisposition in cases 
involving alleged sexual misconduct.13 This prohibition on proof of a victim’s 
sexual activity might in some cases conflict with a criminal defendant’s right to 
an effective defense. In Olden v. Kentucky,14 for example, the Supreme Court 
held that a defendant in a rape case had the right to cross-examine his victim 
about her cohabitation with another man in an effort to show her bias.15 
Recognizing that a rigid prohibition on evidence of a victim’s past acts could be 
unconstitutional in some cases, the Advisory Committee added an open-ended 
exception to the text of Rule 412 that allows such evidence if excluding it “would 
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”16 
One might argue that the language is superfluous because the Constitution 
automatically trumps any contrary provision; Rule 412 cannot exclude evidence 
of a victim’s sexual history if the Constitution forbids it. But the amended 
language is useful for two reasons: (1) it avoids damage to the credibility of the 
Rules caused when a rule is subject to unconstitutional application; and (2) it 
operates as a red flag for unwary litigants, directing them to a source of law 
beyond the rule itself. One might also argue that an amendment specifying the 
 
12 Relatedly, the Rules sometimes need to be updated to reflect Supreme Court precedent 
that is not constitutional in nature. For example, the 1997 amendment to Rule 801(d)(2) 
reflected the Supreme Court’s decision in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), 
and the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 reflected the holdings in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999). 
13 FED. R. EVID. 412(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 
amendment (explaining that amended Rule “aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the 
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with 
public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the 
factfinding process”). 
14 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 
15 Id. at 232 (reasoning that defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation outweighed 
potential prejudicial impact of cross-examination). 
16 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). 
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type of evidence that courts may not constitutionally exclude would be more 
helpful. For example, the Rule 412 exception might have alerted judges and 
litigants that evidence of a victim’s sexual history should be admitted “when 
exclusion is unreasonable and would deprive the defendant of critical evidence 
of his innocence.” That solution may appear more helpful at first glance because 
it directs the inexpert litigant to the constitutional standard that might be 
implicated. But adding specificity is risky as well. Constitutional doctrine is 
dynamic, subject to extension or limitation depending on specific facts as well 
as the makeup of the Supreme Court. Future cases may define constitutional 
protections differently. The deliberate process of rulemaking is ill-suited to the 
task of chasing a moving target, and any attempt to codify constitutional doctrine 
with specificity runs the risk that further amendments will be necessary in order 
to keep up with changes. Perhaps counterintuitively, therefore, a more generic 
reference to constitutional considerations is typically preferable because it offers 
express notice of a potential constitutional issue and will never need to be 
amended. 
Another example of drafting in the shadow of the Constitution arose after the 
Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.17 That case 
held that admitting certificates to prove the results of a drug test violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation where those certificates 
were prepared for purposes of litigation and where the analysts who prepared 
them were not called by the government to testify.18 Following Melendez-Diaz, 
it was widely recognized that the hearsay exception allowing proof of the 
absence of a public record—Rule 803(10)—was subject to unconstitutional 
application. This was because the Rule allowed a public official to prepare an 
affidavit indicating that the official had conducted a search for a particular public 
record and failed to find it—most commonly, a record indicating that the 
defendant had a license to carry a gun or had been permitted to re-enter the 
country after being deported.19 This affidavit would substitute for in-court 
testimony by the public official and would be offered as evidence that no such 
record existed. Because the prosecutor would have prepared the affidavit solely 
for purposes of admitting it against a defendant in a criminal prosecution, it 
 
17 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
18 Id. at 311 (finding that defendants had right to be confronted by analysts at trial because 
analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statements and analysts were “witnesses” for Sixth 
Amendment purposes). 
19 Before being amended to address Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, Rule 803(10) 
permitted the absence of a public record to be proven by a certificate prepared for the purposes 
of the criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir. 
1983) (proffering certificate through Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) to prove absence of 
firearm license). 
  
1882 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1873 
 
would be indistinguishable from the records found constitutionally 
objectionable in Melendez-Diaz.20 
No stakeholder has an interest in the Evidence Rules being unconstitutionally 
applied. The prosecution obtains no legitimate advantage from an 
unconstitutional use of an evidence rule; any conviction based on such a use runs 
the risk of being overturned. Although one might argue that a rule simply will 
not be applied if its application is unconstitutional, that argument depends upon 
the parties to raise and police the constitutional interest at issue. That cannot be 
taken as a given, even in our adversarial system, as some lawyers may simply 
not know enough to raise it. Therefore, all rulemaking stakeholders recognized 
the need to amend Rule 803(10) to reflect the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Melendez-Diaz. 
Crafting an amendment to remedy the constitutional defect in Rule 803(10) 
was a relatively straightforward undertaking because the Supreme Court in 
Melendez-Diaz offered a solution. The Court noted that “notice-and-demand” 
procedures, such as were in use in some state jurisdictions, would satisfy Sixth 
Amendment concerns.21 Given the explicit “out” provided by the Supreme 
Court, the Advisory Committee did not rely on a generic constitutional catch-all 
exception to rectify the infirmity in Rule 803(10). Rather, it formulated an 
amendment setting forth a specific notice-and-demand procedure based upon the 
Supreme Court opinion. The amendment requires a prosecutor who intends to 
use a certificate under Rule 803(10) to provide the defendant with written notice 
at least fourteen days before trial.22 It then gives the defendant seven days to 
object to the certificate and to demand the presence of the author at trial.23 The 
amendment is to-the-point, indisputable, and effective. Under these 
circumstances, the new procedure was superior to a generic solution, which 
would have simply permitted the use of a Rule 803(10) certificate “unless 
prohibited by the Constitution.”24 The notice-and-demand procedure provides a 
means of solving the constitutional problem—a means directed by the Supreme 
Court itself—whereas generic language would leave prosecutors with no means 
to admit certificates as contemplated by the Rule. 
More recently, in 2017, the Supreme Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado25 suddenly rendered Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) subject to 
 
20 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (holding that admitting certificates to prove material 
fact violated Confrontation Clause where their “sole purpose” was to be used in criminal 
prosecution). 
21 Id. at 326-27 (discussing constitutional implications of notice-and-demand procedures). 
22 FED. R. EVID. 803(10)(B). 
23 Id. The amended language provides that in a criminal case, “a prosecutor who intends 
to offer a certification provides written notice of that intent at least 14 days before trial, and 
the defendant does not object in writing within 7 days of receiving the notice—unless the 
court sets a different time for the notice or the objection.” Id. 
24 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
25 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
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unconstitutional application.26 Rule 606(b) prohibits impeachment of a verdict 
through juror testimony about the deliberations that led to the verdict.27 The 
prohibition is designed to protect the finality of verdicts and the integrity of the 
jury system by shielding jurors from post-verdict inquisition about the quality of 
their deliberations.28 Although the prohibition on juror testimony is subject to 
exceptions when the jurors are exposed to extraneous prejudicial information or 
outside influences, courts have interpreted these exceptions narrowly and 
constitutional challenges to the Rule 606(b) prohibition have traditionally 
proved unsuccessful.29  
In Peña-Rodriguez, however, the Court found that Colorado’s version of Rule 
606(b), which mirrors the federal provision,30 was unconstitutionally applied to 
exclude juror testimony about racist statements made by a juror during 
deliberations.31 Peña-Rodriguez was found guilty of unlawful sexual contact and 
harassment.32 After the jury was discharged, two jurors approached Peña-
Rodriguez’s counsel reporting that another juror had expressed anti-Hispanic 
 
26 Id. at 869 (“[T]he Court now holds that when a juror makes a clear statement that 
indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the 
Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial 
court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial 
guarantee.”). 
27 FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (“During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s 
deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s 
mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.”). 
28 For a discussion of the rationale behind the rule and the limited nature of the exceptions, 
see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 606.02 (11th ed. 2015) [hereinafter FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL]. 
29 For example, in 1987, the Supreme Court declined to find a constitutional exception to 
Rule 606(b) to allow juror testimony about extensive intoxication, drug use, and illegal drug 
transactions among jurors in a federal criminal trial in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
127 (1987). The Court defended the constitutionality of Rule 606(b), emphasizing the 
important interests it protects and highlighting all of the mechanisms apart from post-verdict 
juror testimony that may serve to expose juror misconduct. Id. Some federal courts, prior to 
Peña-Rodriguez, had in fact applied Rule 606(b) to preclude evidence of racist statements 
made by jurors during deliberations. See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1241 
(10th Cir. 2008) (“We therefore reject the defendant’s argument that Rule 606(b) contains an 
implicit exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations, nor do we 
think the Rule is unconstitutional as applied in this case.”). 
30 COLO. R. EVID. 606(b). 
31 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870 (“While the trial court concluded that Colorado’s 
Rule 606(b) did not permit it even to consider the resulting affidavits, the Court’s holding 
today removes that bar. When jurors disclose an instance of racial bias as serious as the one 
involved in this case, the law must not wholly disregard its occurrence.”). 
32 Id. at 861. 
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bias toward both Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness during deliberations.33 
Relying on Rule 606(b), the Colorado courts did not allow this evidence about 
juror deliberations to impeach the verdict.34 The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, finding that precluding the evidence of the juror’s racist comments 
during deliberations violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
and impartial jury.35 Although the Court lauded the basic prohibition on post-
verdict juror testimony as necessary to protect the finality of verdicts, it noted 
unique dangers associated with racial discrimination and opined that alternative 
methods for uncovering juror misconduct (such as voir dire or pre-verdict 
reporting) may be less effective in connection with racial bias.36 Accordingly, 
the Court held that: 
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on 
racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth 
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to 
permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and 
any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.37 
The Court cautioned that the constitutional exception to the Rule 606(b) ban 
on post-verdict juror testimony should be narrowly construed, however, 
emphasizing that “not every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility 
will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial 
inquiry.”38 
The Advisory Committee turned its attention to Rule 606(b) promptly after 
Peña-Rodriguez was handed down to explore amendment alternatives that 
would flag the constitutional exception for racist juror comments.39 Trying to 
codify the specific holding in Peña-Rodriguez was fraught with peril for two 
reasons. First, crafting language for Rule 606(b) that would capture the types of 
juror comments justifying an exception—but that would exclude the “offhand 
comment[s] indicating racial bias or hostility” to which the Supreme Court 
would apply the Rule 606(b) prohibition40—was akin to walking a razor’s edge. 
Second, the principle applied by the Supreme Court in Peña-Rodriguez is 
potentially subject to broader application—for example, to civil cases or to juror 
statements that indicate bias based upon gender, religion, or sexual orientation. 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 862. 
35 Id. at 869 (noting that racial bias must be addressed to prevent systematic loss of 
confidence in jury verdicts). 
36 Id. at 868-69. 
37 Id. at 869. 
38 Id. 
39 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 21, 2017, at 
17-18 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of April 21, 2017], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites 
/default/files/spring_2017_evidence_rules_committee_minutes_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/B6FF-V6SM] (noting possible amendments to Rule 606(b) following Peña-Rodriguez). 
40 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
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An amendment codifying the precise protection recognized in Peña-Rodriguez 
could become obsolete and underinclusive in the event that the Court recognizes 
additional types of bias that justify an exception to the no-impeachment rule.41 
Adding a constitutional red flag is highly desirable, however, because a 
neophyte consulting the language of Rule 606(b) would remain unaware of 
possible constitutional challenges to the Rule’s application. The Advisory 
Committee concluded that the only workable drafting solution would be a 
generic constitutional red flag like the one added to Rule 412.42 Such an 
amendment would, at least, signal for a litigant that Rule 606(b) could not be 
applied in circumstances that “would violate a defendant’s constitutional 
rights.”43 After significant research, reflection, and dialogue spanning a year, the 
Committee decided not to propose such an amendment. The Committee was 
concerned that adding such generic language could suggest a broad 
constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) and would actually invite new 
constitutional challenges to Rule 606(b) beyond the limits of the Peña-
Rodriguez holding.44 
But for all of the reasons explored above, leaving Rule 606(b) devoid of any 
warning to litigants about the unconstitutionality of excluding juror testimony 
about racist comments during deliberations threatens the integrity of the Rules. 
Preserving Rule 606(b)’s silence regarding constitutional challenges will not 
prevent litigants who are aware of the Peña-Rodriguez holding from asserting 
constitutional objections beyond the limits of that narrow holding. Indeed, 
litigants have already attempted to utilize Peña-Rodriguez to mount 
constitutional challenges to the exclusion of post-verdict juror testimony 
concerning juror misconduct beyond racist statements about a defendant.45 Thus, 
 
41 Justice Alito, dissenting in Peña-Rodriguez, stated that “although the Court tries to limit 
the degree of intrusion, it is doubtful that there are principled grounds for preventing the 
expansion of today’s holding.” Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
42 See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). 
43 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 26-27, 2018, at 
17-19 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites 
/default/files/ev_minutes_april_2018_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFD7-HYZV]. 
44 See id. (tabling issue of amending Rule 606(b) because potential constitutional 
exception was problematic); Meeting Minutes of April 21, 2017, supra note 39, at 17-18 
(resolving to postpone consideration of Rule 606(b) amendment in favor of monitoring cases 
following Peña-Rodriguez because of Committee consensus that amendment could contribute 
to expansion of constitutional challenges). 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding juror’s 
statement that he assumed defendant was guilty from outset not within protection of Peña-
Rodriguez); Austin v. Davis, 876 F.3d 757, 797 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting challenge to death 
sentence based on juror’s statement that he made up his mind to vote for death regardless of 
mitigating circumstances because Peña-Rodriguez did not extend to testimony about 
prejudgment); United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting Peña-
Rodriguez challenge to exclusion of post-verdict juror testimony about racist statements made 
by jury foreperson about fellow jurors during heated deliberations). 
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the only real consequence of maintaining silence in Rule 606(b) is to ensure that 
litigants who are in the dark about the constitutional challenge available under 
Peña-Rodriguez will remain in the dark. Even if a generic amendment were to 
encourage additional constitutional challenges to Rule 606(b) beyond Peña-
Rodriguez, this would not necessarily be undesirable. If arguments invited by a 
constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) are meritless, courts can easily reject 
them, as they have already done.46 But if the Constitution does require additional 
exceptions to the default prohibition on post-verdict juror testimony, alerting 
litigants to the potential for such constitutional protection is laudable. Be that as 
it may, the recent Peña-Rodriguez decision that makes Rule 606(b) susceptible 
to unconstitutional application reveals the difficulty inherent in drafting in the 
shadow of the Constitution. 
B. Rulemakers as Referees: Resolving Conflicts in the Courts 
The principal advantage of a federal code of evidence is that the law is 
uniform throughout the federal court system. Litigants need not worry that the 
rule applied in one federal courthouse will differ from the one applicable in 
another. While that is the ideal, the harsh reality is that no code of evidence—
however carefully drafted—can ever be so clear that it is subject to only one 
interpretation. And that is particularly true of the Federal Rules of Evidence—
Rules that began with an Advisory Committee draft that Congress took up and 
substantially altered.47 All are familiar with the old adage about cooks and 
kitchens. So it will happen from time to time that federal courts will interpret the 
same evidence rule in differing ways. 
The first possibility for a rulemaking committee faced with a conflict in the 
application of a rule is to do nothing at all. If the conflict is one that is still 
emerging in the federal courts and that has some realistic hope of being resolved 
through developing precedent, leaving well enough alone may be a viable 
option. But when a conflict is long-standing, shows no signs of being resolved, 
and creates divergent standards for litigants operating within the same court 
system, it is a drafting committee’s responsibility to resolve the impasse. Indeed, 
one of the main reasons that the Advisory Committee was reconstituted in 1992 
 
46 See, e.g., Baker, 899 F.3d at 133-34 (listing cases that have refused to extend Peña-
Rodriguez beyond its narrow holding); Berardi v. Paramo, 705 Fed. App’x 517, 518-19 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (rejecting challenge based on juror’s statement that jury would have convicted 
immediately if races of defendant and victim were reversed); Vera v. United States, No. 
3:11-cv-00864, 2017 WL 3081666, at *9-10 (D. Conn. July 19, 2017) (rejecting challenge 
based on juror’s claim that other jurors pressured her to convict); Montes v. Macomber, No. 
3:15-cv-02377, 2017 WL 1354779, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2017) (rejecting challenge 
based on jurors’ discussion of fact that defendant did not testify). 
47 See generally DANIEL J. CAPRA, ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES TO THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF EVIDENCE THAT MAY REQUIRE CLARIFICATION (1998), reprinted in 182 F.R.D. 268 (1998) 
(discussing numerous Advisory Committee proposals that were rejected by Congress—
leading to many Committee Notes that do not correctly describe rule as enacted). 
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was to assist in the resolution of conflicts in the application of the Rules.48 In the 
context of damaging and unresolved conflicts, the benefits of uniformity and 
fairness outweigh the potential costs of dislocation and unintended 
consequences. 
Rectifying a conflict in the courts is usually a difficult task. The Evidence 
Advisory Committee must determine which of the conflicting interpretations of 
a given rule is preferable in terms of policy, as well as the efficiency and 
workability of the evidentiary result. The amendment to the Rule 807 residual 
hearsay exception proposed in 2018 illustrates the varying degrees of challenge 
faced in resolving conflicts in the courts.49 The existing residual exception 
permits courts to admit hearsay statements not “specifically covered” by other 
categorical hearsay exceptions when those hearsay statements (1) have 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that are “equivalent” to those found 
in other hearsay exceptions, (2) are “offered as evidence of a material fact,” (3) 
are “more probative” than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain 
through reasonable efforts, and (4) will best serve the purposes of the Rules and 
the “interests of justice.”50 
There are multiple conflicts in the federal case law on Rule 807 that the 
proposed amendment seeks to rectify. First, courts are split on whether they can 
consider corroborating evidence in determining whether a hearsay statement is 
sufficiently trustworthy. The “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” 
required by Rule 807 traditionally refer to the influences and inherent 
motivations acting upon a declarant at the time of the hearsay statement. For 
example, to evaluate the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
surrounding a child’s hearsay statement accusing a defendant of sexual abuse, a 
court would look to the child’s motivations, to the identity of the recipient of the 
statement, to the timing of and manner in which the statement was conveyed 
(whether offered spontaneously or in response to an inquiry), and to the content 
of the statement to determine whether it reveals age-inappropriate knowledge.51 
Beyond these circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, however, 
corroborating evidence—such as from a medical examination showing that the 
child was in fact sexually abused or testimony that the defendant acted 
suspiciously after the alleged event—would also have some tendency to suggest 
that the hearsay statement was accurate. Some courts have held that 
 
48 See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 5, at 911 (“Because the Supreme Court rarely grants 
certiorari, a Committee will play an important role in resolving conflicts.”). 
49 The amendment has been approved by the Judicial Conference and referred to the 
Supreme Court. Barring unforeseen circumstances, the amendment will take effect on 
December 1, 2019. Pending Rules and Form Amendments, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts. 
gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-and-forms-amendments [https://perma.cc/6KTX-M9K5] 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
50 FED. R. EVID. 807. 
51 For a discussion of these circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, see FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 28, § 807.02[4]. 
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corroboration of a hearsay statement by other evidence may not be considered 
in evaluating the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement for purposes of the 
residual exception.52 In these circuits, the court may consider only the 
circumstances surrounding the statement itself in applying the residual exception 
and must ignore corroborative information like the aforementioned medical 
exam and suspicious conduct. Most courts, however, have found that 
corroboration is relevant to reliability and that it is appropriate to consider 
independent evidence supporting the truth of the statement in applying Rule 
807.53 Because the application of Rule 807 differs depending upon the circuit in 
which a case is brought, the Advisory Committee sought to create a uniform 
approach. 
In contrast to some other circuit splits that create close questions on the merits, 
the role of corroborating evidence in the residual-exception equation presented 
a relatively straightforward decision for the Advisory Committee. Corroboration 
is a time-honored way of supporting accuracy in our justice system. In proving 
a charge or claim at trial, demonstrating that a witness’s account is corroborated 
by other evidence is an important means of assuring the factfinder that the 
witness is telling the truth. Accordingly, there is no rational reason to reject 
corroboration in a trustworthiness inquiry under the residual exception. Thus, 
the Committee proposed an amendment expressly approving the consideration 
of corroborating evidence in assessing the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement 
for purposes of Rule 807.54 In so doing, the Committee created a uniform 
approach to corroboration that is most consistent with principles of 
trustworthiness. 
The second long-standing conflict in the interpretation of Rule 807 posed a 
greater challenge. This conflict relates to the language stating that the residual 
exception applies to hearsay statements even if “not specifically covered by a 
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804.”55 One way of interpreting this language 
is to exclude a hearsay statement under Rule 807 if it “nearly misses” one of the 
 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Stoney End of Horn, 829 F.3d 681, 685-86 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(rejecting corroboration). 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 824 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding hearsay 
statement admissible under Rule 807 in part because it was corroborated by independent 
evidence); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 643 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding 
declarants’ out-of-court statements “especially reliable” for purposes of residual exception 
because they corroborated one another). 
54 The proposed amendment to Rule 807 that is currently being considered by the Supreme 
Court requires the court to find that “the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of 
trustworthiness—after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and 
evidence, if any, corroborating the statement.” Memorandum Regarding Transmittal of 
Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence from James C. Duff, Sec’y, Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., to Chief Justice of the U.S. & Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court, 
at Attachment I (Oct. 24, 2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/scotus_federal_rules_package_2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG2L-ULDY]. 
55 FED. R. EVID. 807 (emphasis added). 
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standard exceptions. According to this interpretation, a hearsay statement that 
nearly misses a categorical exception may not be admitted through the residual 
exception because hearsay of that variety is “specifically covered” by a standard 
exception (though the statement is not admissible under it). For example, assume 
that the unavailable mother of a murder defendant stated before trial: “I am a 
terrible parent—if I had been attentive to my son, he would not be murdering 
people now.” Her hearsay statement comes close to being a declaration against 
interest under Rule 804(b)(3) because it seems to acknowledge the mother’s 
failure as a parent in connection with her son’s conduct. Yet, it nearly misses the 
Rule 804(b)(3) hearsay exception because the only interests covered by the 
exception are pecuniary and penal interests.56 Accordingly, the mother’s 
admission of inattentiveness would not qualify. Under an interpretation of Rule 
807 that excludes “near-misses” therefore, a court could not admit this statement 
as residual hearsay even if the court were to find it reliable. Some federal courts 
subscribe to this interpretation of Rule 807 and end their inquiry under the 
residual exception upon finding that the hearsay statement nearly misses a 
standard exception.57 
Most courts, however, have admitted “near misses” under Rule 807 when 
such hearsay statements are found to be independently trustworthy. Indeed, 
some courts rely on the fact that a hearsay statement very nearly misses a 
categorical hearsay exception as an indication of its reliability.58 For example, 
in United States v. Valdez-Soto,59 a government witness in a cocaine distribution 
case surprised the government by testifying that the defendants did not supply 
him with cocaine.60 In response, the government sought to admit inconsistent 
post-arrest hearsay statements by the witness identifying the defendants as his 
suppliers.61 The hearsay statements were not admissible through the Rule 
 
56 Rule 804(b)(3) provides a hearsay exception if the declarant is unavailable and: 
a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made [the statement] only if 
the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s 
proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s 
claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A). In addition, declarations against penal interest offered in criminal 
cases must be supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statements. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B). 
57 See, e.g., Glowczenski v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(finding that treatise was “specifically covered by another hearsay exception, Rule 803(18),” 
though not admissible under it, and therefore “Rule 807 is inapplicable”). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (“And the 
reference to guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those in the enumerated exceptions 
strongly suggests that almost fitting within one of these exceptions cuts in favor of admission, 
not against.”); United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding that residual 
exception can be used when proponent nearly misses requirements of another exception). 
59 31 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). 
60 Id. at 1470. 
61 Id. at 1469. 
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801(d)(1)(A) hearsay exception specifically governing prior inconsistent 
statements by a testifying witness because that exception admits only statements 
made under oath in a prior trial, hearing, deposition, or other proceeding.62 The 
witness’s post-arrest statements in a parking lot did not meet these stringent 
requirements for substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.63 The 
trial court nonetheless admitted the statements under the residual hearsay 
exception, finding them trustworthy and corroborated.64 The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendants’ argument that prior inconsistent 
hearsay statements inadmissible through Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) 
could not be admitted through the residual exception.65 The court found the fact 
that the hearsay almost fit within Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to counsel in favor of 
admissibility and stated that “the existence of a catch-all hearsay exception is a 
clear indication that Congress did not want courts to admit hearsay only if it fits 
within one of the enumerated exceptions.”66 Thus, while the majority of federal 
courts interpret Rule 807 to allow and even to favor hearsay statements that 
qualify as “near-misses” under standard exceptions, some federal courts reject 
out of hand any hearsay statement that fails to satisfy a categorical hearsay 
exception by a narrow margin.67 
In proposing an amendment to Rule 807, the Advisory Committee was tasked 
with selecting one of these approaches to “near-miss” hearsay as the uniform 
rule for the federal system. This task was made more difficult by the fact that 
there are sound arguments favoring both. On the one hand, admitting statements 
that nearly miss satisfying the requirements of a standard exception is in keeping 
with the rationale underlying the creation of a residual hearsay exception. The 
core function of a residual exception is to allow a reliable statement to be 
admitted when it is not admissible under any other exception. Given the number 
and variety of standard hearsay exceptions, one should expect that a hearsay 
statement possessing the guarantees of trustworthiness necessary for admission 
under the residual exception might “nearly miss” one standard exception or 
another. Thus, to exclude “near-miss” hearsay could be said to undermine the 
fundamental purpose of a residual exception. 
On the other hand, an approach that excludes hearsay statements that nearly 
miss standard exceptions has its virtue. Allowing near misses to be admitted 
through the residual exception could allow litigants to evade some of the 
important limitations and requirements in the standard exceptions. For example, 
Congress limited the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements 
under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to those made under oath in a trial, hearing, deposition, 
 
62 Id. at 1471; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
63 Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d at 1471. 
64 Id. at 1470. 
65 Id. at 1471. 
66 Id. 
67 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
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or other proceeding.68 Congress designed these requirements to ensure that the 
witness’s prior inconsistent statement was actually made and to provide some 
assurance that the prior statement was reliable.69 In allowing the prior 
inconsistent statement of the government’s testifying witness that did not satisfy 
these important criteria to be admitted for its truth through the residual exception 
in Valdez-Soto, the Ninth Circuit allowed the government to circumvent the 
congressionally imposed limits on prior inconsistencies. 
Because the question was so close, the Committee ultimately opted for the 
position taken by the vast majority of courts: permitting near-miss hearsay 
statements—if trustworthy—to be admitted through the residual exception.70 In 
selecting the optimal uniform standard to resolve a conflict with credible 
arguments on both sides, a drafter should ordinarily give greater weight to the 
majority rule on an issue. First, the fact that most federal courts follow one path 
is certainly an indication that it is likely the better result. Furthermore, adopting 
the majority rule results in less disruption to the evidentiary system countrywide 
because fewer jurisdictions will be forced to reverse course. Consequently, the 
proposed amendment eliminates language in the existing Rule limiting its 
application to hearsay “not specifically covered by” other hearsay exceptions.71 
Instead, the amended Rule 807 would admit any trustworthy hearsay “not 
admissible under” the categorical exceptions.72 This new terminology resolves 
a long-standing conflict in the courts by expressly allowing a judge to admit 
“near misses” under Rule 807 when the court finds them trustworthy—even 
though they are “not admissible” under other exceptions.73 
 
68 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7086. 
70 See Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra note 43, at 10-11, 17. 
71 Memorandum Regarding Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules from 
Hon. Debra Ann Livingston, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David G. 
Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, at Attachment 6B (May 15, 
2018). 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at Attachment I (providing Rule 807 as approved by Standing Committee and 
referred to Judicial Conference). The proposed amendment also resolves a conflict with 
respect to the notice requirement for the admission of residual hearsay. Unlike other notice 
provisions in the Rules, Rule 807’s notice provision contains no “good cause” exception. This 
is problematic because situations may arise in which a party justifiably offers a statement as 
residual hearsay at trial. Perhaps because a good cause exception is necessary, most courts 
have read a good cause exception into the Rule. See, e.g., Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 
(1st Cir. 1979) (“Most courts have interpreted the pre-trial notice requirement somewhat 
flexibly . . . .”). Yet a few courts, quite understandably, read the Rule as it was written. See, 
e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]here [must] be 
undeviating adherence to the requirement that notice be given in advance of trial.”). Proposing 
the addition of a “good cause” exception to Rule 807’s notice requirement was not difficult 
for the Advisory Committee. The absence of a good cause exception was a mistake by 
Congress, which failed to recognize the need for a good cause safety valve and failed to 
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Since its reconstitution in 1992, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
has fulfilled its responsibility in amending the Rules to resolve many other 
conflicts. Some examples include Rule 407, which was amended in 1997 to 
resolve a conflict concerning the application of the Rule against subsequent 
remedial measures in products liability cases.74 The Advisory Committee 
successfully amended Rule 702 in 2000, in part to deal with conflicts in the case 
law following the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.75 Federal Rule of Evidence 408 was amended in 2006 to 
rectify a conflict in the case law about whether evidence of a civil compromise 
is admissible in a subsequent criminal case.76 Rule 404(a) also was amended in 
2006 to prevent the practice in some courts of admitting evidence of a person’s 
pertinent character trait to prove the person’s conduct in civil cases.77 Finally, 
Rule 804(b)(3) was amended in 2010 to resolve a conflict over whether the 
government in a criminal case must provide corroborating circumstances 
supporting the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement offered as a declaration 
against penal interest.78 
Still, conflicts in the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence remain, 
threatening inconsistency and unfairness to litigants. As explored at length in 
our previous work, federal courts are sharply divided over the application of 
Rule 404(b) to evidence of a criminal defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
While some circuits carefully limit the admissibility of this dynamite evidence 
that almost guarantees conviction, others treat Rule 404(b) as a “rule of 
inclusion” that permissively admits a criminal defendant’s past misdeeds.79 In 
 
consider the need for consistency with the other notice provisions in its zeal to tighten the 
residual exception. Indeed, a good cause exception was justified on its own merits, even if 
every court had followed the Rule as it was written—the fact that the amendment rectified a 
conflict was icing on the cake. 
74 FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“This amendment 
adopts the view of a majority of the circuits that have interpreted Rule 407 to apply to products 
liability actions.”). 
75 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (establishing reliability standard for admissibility of expert 
testimony); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment 
(explaining that amendment was designed to resolve “some confusion over relationship 
between Rules 702 and 703”). 
76 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“Rule 408 has been 
amended to settle some questions in the courts about the scope of the Rule, and to make it 
easier to read.”). 
77 FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (explaining that 
amendment “resolves the dispute in the case law over whether the [Rule 404(a) exceptions] 
permit the circumstantial use of character evidence in civil cases”). 
78 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (“Rule 
804(b)(3) has been amended to provide that the corroborating circumstances requirement 
applies to all declarations against penal interest offered in criminal cases.”). 
79 See Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Character Assassination: Amending Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) to Protect Criminal Defendants, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 832 (2018) 
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addition, there is a current conflict in the federal courts concerning the proper 
application of Rule 106—the rule of completeness. When the government offers 
part of a defendant’s inculpatory written or recorded hearsay statement for its 
truth as a statement of a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), federal courts 
are divided over whether the government may use a hearsay objection to block 
the defendant’s effort to admit another portion of the same statement under Rule 
106 to correct a distorted and misleading impression created by the 
government’s initial presentation.80 Indeed, some federal courts have expressly 
recognized the unfairness inherent in excluding a completing statement 
necessary to remedy distortion, while claiming a lack of power to remedy that 
unfairness under the existing language of Rule 106.81 Federal courts also 
disagree over whether statements made orally may be subject to completion in 
appropriate cases, notwithstanding Rule 106’s omission of oral statements from 
its coverage.82 Courts utilize Rules 404(b) and 106 in criminal trials on a routine 
basis. Appropriate amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence should address 
these lingering incongruities across jurisdictions and provide guidance to 
litigants and trial judges concerning the proper application of these workhorse 
rules.83 
 
(discussing conflict in circuits over proper handling of other-acts evidence in federal criminal 
cases). 
80 Compare United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur case law 
unambiguously establishes that the rule of completeness may be invoked to facilitate the 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence.”), and United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 
1346, 1368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible 
may be used for completion under Rule 106 because “Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its 
function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the 
court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously”), 
with United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 106 does not, however, 
‘render admissible the evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules.’” 
(quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996))), and United States v. 
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 106 does not render admissible 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay.”). 
81 See United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 827 (6th Cir. 2013) (agreeing that 
government made “unfair presentation of” defendants’ statements, but finding that “this 
court’s bar against admitting hearsay under Rule 106 leaves defendants without redress”). 
82 See United States v. Bailey, No. 8:16-cr-00246, 2017 WL 5126163, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 
6, 2017) (chronicling split of authority and highlighting difficulties posed for courts and 
litigants “[i]n the absence of guidance from the Rule or the Committee”). 
83 While the Advisory Committee has proposed an amendment to the notice requirement 
in Rule 404(b), it has not adopted any proposal to address the substantive admissibility 
standard for Rule 404(b) evidence. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, 
BANKRUPTCY, AND CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 43-46 (2018), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018_proposed_rules_amendments_published_f
or_public_comment_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCQ5-MPQU] (setting forth proposed 
amendment to notice provision of Rule 404(b)). The Advisory Committee reviewed the 
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C. Time Keeps on Slipping Into the Future: Amendments to Maintain 
Contemporary Viability 
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Federal Rules of Evidence were 
designed to withstand the test of time.84 In some instances, however, a rule that 
operated very well for the era in which it was enacted may be undermined by 
technological or other societal developments in the trial process. The integrity 
of the Rules is clearly eroded if they are not adaptable to evolving norms and 
technology. Thus, rulemakers must always examine existing provisions to 
ensure that they have kept pace with evolving litigation realities.85 When the 
Rules are not serving contemporary trial needs, the costs generally associated 
with modification of the Rules are eclipsed by the need for change. 
One of the most important examples of a rulemaking response to a dramatic 
shift in litigation norms is Federal Rule of Evidence 502. All evidence 
enthusiasts know the tale of the ill-fated privilege provisions originally proposed 
by the Advisory Committee in drafting the Federal Rules. Congress famously 
torpedoed the detailed proposed rules of privilege in favor of Rule 501, leaving 
privilege to common law development.86 As a result, federal courts considered 
 
conflict in the cases regarding the application of Rule 106 at its fall 2018 meeting and plans 
to continue consideration of Rule 106 in 2019. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, 
AGENDA BOOK: OCTOBER 19, 2018, at 18-46 (2018) [hereinafter AGENDA BOOK: OCTOBER 19, 
2018], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-10-evidence-agenda-book_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8MS-U2HZ]. 
84 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
85 Rulemakers should not only monitor existing provisions to ensure that they have stood 
the test of time; they must also strive when drafting new provisions to avoid terminology or 
devices that are likely to become obsolete with the passage of time. Amendments should 
attempt to rely on broad language likely to capture evolving societal or technological norms. 
Rule 101(b)(6) takes this tack, providing that “a reference to any kind of written material or 
any other medium includes electronically stored information.” FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6). 
Similarly, the recently added Rule 902(14), allowing authentication by way of a certificate 
for data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, was written with the future 
in mind. See FED. R. EVID. 902(14) (providing that certified data copied from these sources is 
self-authenticating). Currently, the process for authenticating such data is through “hash 
value”—a unique digital identifier that the original and the copy both have. See FED. R. EVID. 
902(14) advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment (discussing and describing process of 
authenticating by hash value). The Advisory Committee declined to use the term “hash value” 
in the text of Rule 902(14) for fear that it would be eclipsed by advancements in digital 
identification. Instead, the Rule more generically references authentication through “a process 
of digital identification.” FED. R. EVID. 902(14). The Committee Note discusses authentication 
through hash value as the current process, but affirms that “[t]he rule is flexible enough to 
allow certifications through processes other than comparison of hash value, including by other 
reliable means of identification provided by future technology.” FED. R. EVID. 902(14) 
advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment. 
86 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing in part that “common law—as interpreted by United 
States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege”). For an 
account of the Congressional rejection, see FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 
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claims of privilege and waiver on a case-by-case basis, developing doctrines of 
privilege waiver covering intentional and inadvertent disclosures of privileged 
information. These waiver doctrines varied across jurisdictions. 
Some courts found that a single inadvertent disclosure of a privileged 
document would result in a broad waiver of privilege with respect to all 
undisclosed privileged documents on the same subject.87 Most other courts 
found that an inadvertent disclosure did not necessarily waive privilege, even as 
to the disclosed document, if the privilege holder had taken reasonable 
precautions to prevent the inadvertent production.88 In the face of such uncertain 
and variable standards of waiver, rational and competent counsel developed 
privilege review customs driven by the worst-case scenario: broad subject matter 
waivers resulting from a single inadvertent privileged disclosure. Lawyers (most 
often harried junior associates) spent countless hours reviewing document 
productions to prevent the inadvertent production of even a single scrap of 
privileged paper. While this exhaustive eyes-on privilege review was perhaps 
feasible during the era of paper document creation and retention, the turn of the 
twenty-first century ushered in an explosion of electronically stored data that 
taxed the limits of the possible. Suddenly, voluminous email chains and multiple 
drafts of every relevant document became subject to discovery by an adversary. 
The advent of electronically stored information (“ESI”) meant that everything 
was retained and retrievable in some form. Eyes-on review of every single 
electronically stored terabyte became prohibitively expensive, if not impossible. 
The costs of pre-trial discovery threatened to eclipse the value of a case in some 
circumstances.89 
Leaving privilege waiver to common law development may have been 
workable when the Federal Rules of Evidence were first enacted. But the 
tectonic shift in discovery practice after the ESI revolution meant that the 
 
28, §§ 501.02[2]-[3]. Congress also ensured that an Advisory Committee could not 
promulgate rules of privilege in the future without express Congressional approval. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2012). 
87 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[A]s we have 
previously said, a waiver of privilege in an attorney-client communication extends ‘to all other 
communications relating to the same subject matter.’” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.3d 
793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). 
88 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
89 For concerns about the rising costs of e-discovery and the need for protection from 
waiver, see the public comments on Rule 502, collected in the ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE 
RULES, AGENDA BOOK: APRIL 12-13, 2007, at 130-50 (2007). Specifically, Patrick Oot, Esq. 
(06-EV-031), and Anne Kershaw, Esq. (06-EV-049), made a presentation at the Rule 502 
public hearing illustrating the expenditures made for preproduction privilege review in one 
particular production. “The expenses included review of each email by as many as three sets 
of attorneys; the total expenditure was more than $5,000,000.00. They estimated that if the 
review had been for relevance only, the expenditure would have been reduced by 80%.” Id. 
at 137. 
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original approach to privilege waiver had to adapt to prevent unfairness and the 
wasteful expenditure of resources.90 Working with Congress, the Advisory 
Committee crafted Rule 502 to bring certainty and uniformity to the law of 
waiver resulting from privileged disclosures made in a federal proceeding or to 
a federal office or agency.91 Rule 502(a) eliminated the worst-case scenario of 
broad subject matter waivers resulting from a single inadvertent disclosure by 
providing that subject matter waivers would flow only from intentional 
disclosures and only when the disclosed and undisclosed communications 
“ought in fairness to be considered together.”92 Rule 502(b) also brought more 
certainty to the consequences of inadvertent disclosure, providing that 
reasonable steps to prevent inadvertent disclosure, accompanied by prompt and 
reasonable steps to rectify any error, would protect a privilege holder from 
waiver as to inadvertently disclosed documents.93 Seeking to utilize the 
technology that created the problem with existing privilege doctrine to solve it,  
the Committee Note to Rule 502(b) provides that electronic privilege review 
may form part of a reasonable privilege review process that will avoid waivers 
based upon inadvertent disclosures.94 Going one step further, Rule 502(d) 
authorizes federal court orders allowing parties to retain privilege protection 
even after exchanging documents without preproduction privilege review.95  
 
90 Indeed, another goal of rulemaking is to avoid unnecessary costs, imposed for reasons 
not tied to fair and efficient litigation, whenever possible. Rule 502 served this important goal 
by seeking to limit the costs of preproduction privilege review. Recently adopted Federal 
Rules of Evidence 902(13) and (14) were also intended to avoid the often unnecessary 
production of witnesses who are called to authenticate electronic information. After 
conducting research and reviewing public comment, the Advisory Committee determined that 
such witnesses usually provide perfunctory testimony and are rarely cross-examined. Thus, 
rules allowing them to submit a certification avoid a costly, but empty, act. For a discussion 
of the background to the adoption of Rule 902(13) and (14), and a description and analysis of 
those rules, see HON. PAUL W. GRIMM, GREGORY P. JOSEPH & DANIEL J. CAPRA, BEST 
PRACTICES FOR AUTHENTICATING DIGITAL EVIDENCE 24-30 (2016), reproduced in FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION 577-83 (Daniel J. Capra ed., 2018). 
91 Because Rule 502 was a rule of privilege, it had to be directly enacted by Congress. See 
28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (mandating Congressional approval for changes to evidentiary privilege 
rules). The legislative history on congressional input into the development of Rule 502(b) can 
be found in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 93-102. 
92 FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
93 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (establishing rule for inadvertent disclosures). 
94 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note to Rule 502 (“Depending on the 
circumstances, a party that uses advanced analytical software applications and linguistic tools 
in screening for privilege and work product may be found to have taken ‘reasonable steps’ to 
prevent inadvertent disclosure. The implementation of an efficient system of records 
management before litigation may also be relevant.”). 
95 FED. R. EVID. 502(d). A federal court order protects parties from findings of waiver in 
any future federal or state proceeding. Id. Further, a federal judge may enter such a nonwaiver 
order even in the absence of any agreement by the parties about privilege protection. Id. 
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Thus, following the advent of ESI, an amended approach to waiver became 
imperative to limit the skyrocketing costs of preproduction privilege review. 
Rulemakers must always keep an eye trained on technological advancement to 
ensure that yesterday’s Rules are equipped to handle the demands of 
contemporary litigation.96 
Sometimes, evolving societal norms and increased cultural awareness call for 
an update to the Rules. The most profound example of this phenomenon is the 
1994 adoption of Rule 412 to protect victims of sexual assault from having their 
reputations and past sexual conduct used against them in sexual assault trials.97 
Although the Federal Rules generally prohibit the use of character evidence to 
prove a person’s conduct, Rule 404(a)(2)(B) follows the common law in 
allowing criminal defendants to present evidence of their alleged victim’s 
pertinent character trait to argue that the victim behaved consistently with 
character on the occasion in question.98 In a battery prosecution, for example, 
Rule 404 permits a criminal defendant to prove that his alleged victim had a 
violent and aggressive character in order to suggest that the would-be victim was 
in fact the aggressor. In rape prosecutions, however, this time-honored tactic 
resulted in defendants attacking the dress, sexual mores, speech, and past 
behavior of their victims to justify a sexual assault.99 More advanced and 
enlightened contemporary societal norms recognize that a victim’s prior 
consensual sexual behavior with another, or a victim’s choice of attire, has very 
little probative value with respect to his or her consent to sex with the 
 
96 Effective rulemakers should be proactive in proposing amendments to keep pace with 
advancing technological norms. Although an Advisory Committee should monitor the Rules 
to identify conflicts and problems that have already arisen in the case law, there may be 
trouble brewing beneath the surface of a particular rule. In order to permit feedback from all 
relevant constituencies, it takes at least three years for a rule to be enacted. For a discussion 
of the timeline, see Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1655, 1671-74 (1995). Even when concrete inefficiencies and anomalies in the 
application of the rule may only be on the horizon, the system may be undermined in 
significant ways before an amendment can resolve the issues if the Committee hesitates to act 
until those problems materialize in reported cases. A recent example of the Committee 
working proactively to avoid trouble still around the corner is the 2017 amendment to the 
ancient documents hearsay exception—Rule 803(16)—to prevent admission of an onslaught 
of unreliable ESI. For more on the need to amend Rule 803(16) in light of the prevalence of 
ESI, see generally Daniel J. Capra, Electronically Stored Information and the Ancient 
Documents Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Fix It Before Anyone Finds Out About It, 17 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2015). 
97 For the legislative history of the 1994 amendment, see FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 
2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 76-80. 
98 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B). 
99 See 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) (noting that under 
then-existing law, “rape trials become inquisitions into the victim’s morality, not trials of the 
defendant’s innocence or guilt”). 
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defendant.100 And an evidentiary standard that permitted defendants to launch a 
smear campaign against a victim invited jurors to acquit unjustly because the 
victim “had it coming.” Furthermore, evidence rules permitting a defendant to 
humiliate and traumatize an alleged victim by placing his or her entire sexual 
history under a very public microscope undermined victims’ willingness to 
report and pursue prosecution of sexual offenders.101 In recognition of these 
realities, Rule 412 was adopted to reject these traditional practices in sexual 
assault cases.102 Rule 412 provides substantial hurdles to the admission of 
evidence of an alleged victim’s sexual “predisposition” or past sexual behavior 
in civil or criminal proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct.103 Rule 
412 therefore responds directly to changing societal consciousness regarding 
sexual assault. 
Although the vast majority of the Evidence Rules may withstand the test of 
time, there are some that must be adjusted to account for modern technological 
or cultural norms. In addition to ensuring that the Rules are not subject to 
misinterpretation or misapplication, therefore, rulemakers must constantly 
monitor the shifting societal landscape to be certain that the Rules that served 
the justice system in eras gone by are up to the task of fairly resolving modern 
disputes. 
D. Simplicity Is the Ultimate Sophistication 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and other commentators have long warned against 
alterations to the Federal Rules of Evidence for fear that changes will destroy 
their brevity and simplicity.104 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
 
100 See Sandoval v. Alcedo, 996 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining rape shield rule: 
“in an age of post-Victorian sexual practice, in which most unmarried young women are 
sexually active, the fact that the woman has voluntarily engaged in a particular sexual activity 
on previous occasions does not provide appreciable support for an inference that she 
consented to engage in this activity with the defendant on the occasion on which she claims 
that she was raped”). 
101 See 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) (“Too often in this 
country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed when they report and prosecute the rape. 
Bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial almost 
as degrading as the rape itself. . . . [So] it is not surprising that it is the least reported crime.”). 
102 H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 609 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839 
(adopting the Committee Note as legislative history). 
103 FED. R. EVID. 412(a). The prohibition is subject to limited exceptions in criminal cases. 
FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1). Exceptions to this prohibition in civil cases depend on a balancing 
test that provides significant protection for victims. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2) (stating that 
victim’s sexual predisposition or behavior may be admitted in civil case if “its probative value 
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any 
party”). 
104 See, e.g., Victor Gold, The Three Commandments of Amending the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1619 (2017) (stating that first “commandment” of 
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that make them more concise and more accessible to lawyers and judges using 
them in a trial or pre-trial context accordingly serve, rather than undermine, the 
goals of the Rules. Rulemakers should not be so resistant to change that they 
become reluctant to consider amendments that make the Rules easier to 
understand and apply. 
Probably the best example of an amendment package designed for this precise 
purpose is the restyling of the Evidence Rules in 2011. The goals of restyling 
are virtuous—to make the Rules (1) more user-friendly, (2) less legalistic, (3) 
easier to visualize and understand, (4) less ambiguous (most importantly by 
replacing the word “shall” with “may” or “must” depending on the situation), 
and (5) consistent in terminology.105 The restyling project added helpful 
numbering, new subsections, and bullet points, as well as explanatory headings 
designed to make the Rules easier to read and use.106 With respect to the 
Evidence Rules, there were two additional benefits to restyling. First, by the time 
restyling for the Evidence Rules was being considered, the Appellate, Criminal, 
and Civil Rules had already been restyled, so it made sense in terms of trans-
rule uniformity to apply the same restyling principles to the Evidence Rules.107 
Second, restyling provided an opportunity for a new “definitions” section to 
promote uniform application of terminology and to accommodate technological 
development in the presentation of evidence. The original Rules were rife with 
references to paper-based information, and a “definitions” section presented a 
ready vehicle for clarifying that references to paper include the ESI that has 
exploded since the enactment of the original Rules.108 The Advisory Committee 
was able to achieve the desired improvement in the Rules without any substantial 
readjustment in the principles underlying the Rules or even to well-accepted 
terminology. Indeed, the Advisory Committee wisely concluded that the 
restyling could not change a “sacred phrase”—defined as a phrase that has 
become so familiar to courts and litigators that to change it would result in 
substantial dislocation costs.109 Therefore, amendments that allow the Rules to 
 
amending Federal Rules of Evidence is “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”); supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
105 See FED. R. EVID. 101 restyled rules committee’s note to 2011 amendment, reproduced 
in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 7. The restyling 
principles were derived from BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 
(2d ed. 1995), and BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND EDITING COURT RULES 
(1969). 
106 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (adding new heading and subsections (a) and (b) to standard 
of relevance); FED. R. EVID. 404 (same). 
107 The Appellate Rules were restyled effective December 1, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. 
8652. The Criminal Rules were restyled effective December 1, 2002. See 148 CONG. REC. 
6813. The Civil Rules were restyled effective December 1, 2007. See 153 CONG. REC. 10,612. 
108 See FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6) (stating that references to written materials include ESI). 
109 See FED. R. EVID. 101 restyled rules committee’s note to 2011 amendment, reproduced 
in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 10 (defining change 
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function optimally in the very context for which they were designed can and 
should be advanced. 
Another prime example of amending the Rules to enhance simplicity is the 
2014 amendment to the hearsay exception for prior consistent statements in Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).110 The original exception provided that a testifying witness’s prior 
consistent statement, when admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting an 
opponent’s charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, could be used 
substantively for its truth as well. The original Advisory Committee articulated 
two reasons favoring substantive use of the admitted statements. First, the 
Committee Note emphasized that pre-trial consistent statements would only be 
admitted to rehabilitate when they matched previously admitted trial testimony. 
The hearsay risks associated with out-of-court statements appear less significant 
when the statements are preceded by live testimony to the same effect.111 
Second, the Advisory Committee asserted that prior consistencies only become 
relevant to rehabilitate after their opponent has opened the door to their 
admission with a triggering charge of recent fabrication or improper motive.112 
In essence, the Advisory Committee adopted what could be characterized as a 
“why not” approach to the substantive use of prior consistent statements, 
explaining that there is “no sound reason” why such statements “should not be 
received generally” once they are received for rehabilitative purposes.113 
But impeaching-attacks other than those of recent fabrication and improper 
motivation may also be repaired with a prior consistent statement. For example, 
if a witness’s recollection of a crucial event is challenged, a statement consistent 
with the witness’s testimony, made close in time to the event in question before 
memory had a chance to fade, would rebut the attack. Furthermore, the rationale 
for allowing substantive use of prior consistent statements admitted to rebut 
charges of recent fabrication or improper motive applies equally to prior 
consistent statements admitted for the purpose of rebutting an attack on memory. 
The prior consistency would merely echo testimony previously delivered live 
from the witness stand subject to cross-examination. And, admission would flow 
directly from the opponent’s decision to impeach based upon lack of memory. 
Yet, under the original rule, a prior consistent statement admitted to repair an 
attack on memory was admissible only to rehabilitate the witness and not as 
 
to sacred phrases as substantive and inappropriate); Symposium, The Restyled Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1435, 1489 (2012) (discussing “sacred” phrases). 
110 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). 
111 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment (“If the 
witness admits on the stand that he made the statement and that it was true, he adopts the 
statement and there is no hearsay problem.”). 
112 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment (“[I]f 
the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is 
apparent why it should not be received generally.”). 
113 Id. In contrast to certain prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate, the Advisory 
Committee articulated concern regarding the “general and indiscriminate use of previously 
prepared statements.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note to proposed rules. 
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substantive evidence (i.e., for its truth). This distinction between rehabilitative 
and substantive use required a limiting instruction that no juror—indeed no 
evidence professor—could understand. The instruction would go something like 
this:  
The witness’s prior statement that he observed the event [that mirrors exactly 
his trial testimony about observing the event] may not be used as proof that he 
saw the event. Rather, it may show only that his memory of the event is as good 
now as it was before.114 
Adding insult to injury, the dizzying mental gymnastics required by this type 
of instruction served no legitimate purpose. The use of a truly consistent prior 
statement for its truth should make little difference to anyone—by definition, the 
hearsay statement matches what the witness has already stated on the stand. 
Accordingly, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was amended in 2014 to eliminate the 
needlessly complex distinction between prior consistent statements offered to 
repair charges of recent fabrication or improper motive and those admitted to 
repair other impeaching attacks. The amended Rule provides for a simple and 
elegant approach to the substantive use of prior consistencies that scuttles the 
vexing and incomprehensible limiting instruction—if ever a prior consistent 
statement is admissible for rehabilitation it is also admissible for its truth.115 
 
In sum, there are several identifiable circumstances in which amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence are worth the potential dislocation costs inherent 
in any change. When the Rules may be subject to an unconstitutional application 
as written, an amendment serves the important goal of aligning the rule book 
that lawyers carry into court with the constitutional protections outlined in 
Supreme Court precedent.116 When irreconcilable conflicts in the interpretation 
and application of the Rules arise among circuits, amendments become 
necessary to fulfill the promise of uniformity of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.117 When tectonic shifts in technology, trial practice, or society render 
rules obsolete, unfair, or ill-equipped for the task they were designed to perform, 
rulemakers need to step in to preserve the contemporary viability of the Rules.118 
Finally, the benefits of amendments that enhance the simplicity and brevity of 
the Rules and that make them easier for judges and litigants to deploy outweigh 
the costs of change.119 Rather than debating the risks inherent in rule changes 
 
114 See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that difference 
between substantive and rehabilitation use for prior consistent statements “may seem 
unrealistically subtle in light of the effect a jury may be inclined to give the statements”). 
115 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note 
to 2014 amendment. 
116 See supra Section I.A. 
117 See supra Section I.B. 
118 See supra Section I.C. 
119 See supra Section I.D. 
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generally, rulemakers can utilize this taxonomy to distinguish a necessary 
amendment from wasteful tinkering. 
II. MARRYING POLITICS AND PROSE: NATURAL BARRIERS TO CHANGE 
Even in the circumstances explored above, when amendments to the Evidence 
Rules are justified, there are natural barriers to change built into the rulemaking 
process. The Judicial Conference rulemaking process is a delicate dance 
choreographed to include roles for Congress, the Supreme Court, and the DOJ. 
Congress has constitutional authority over rulemaking for the federal courts and 
has delegated concurrent power to the Supreme Court (and thence to the Judicial 
Conference) via the Enabling Act.120 Under the Enabling Act, the Judicial 
Conference can obtain enactment of a federal rule of practice or procedure by 
having the Supreme Court submit the proposed rule to Congress by May 1 of a 
given year. Congress then has until December 1 to act on a proposal. If Congress 
takes no action, the amendment becomes effective on December 1.121 Thus, both 
Congress and the Supreme Court possess important authority over the 
rulemaking process and may determine the fate of a proposed amendment. 
Although the DOJ has no independent rulemaking authority, it enjoys a 
permanent position on the Evidence Advisory Committee and on the Standing 
Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure, to which the Advisory 
Committee reports—as well as, of course, influence in Congress. Thus, the DOJ 
represents a powerful voice that helps to shape rulemaking policy. 
Achieving important updates to the Rules while according each branch of 
government the appropriate deference throughout the rulemaking process poses 
a significant challenge for an Advisory Committee seeking to fulfill its oversight 
obligations. 
A. As You Wish: Deference to Congress 
A significant and recurring question for the Advisory Committee is how much 
deference to afford congressional intent in amending the Evidence Rules. 
Although the Enabling Act delegates Congress’s rulemaking authority, it 
represents a concurrent delegation of authority to amend the Rules. In addition 
to Congress’s power to reject a proposed amendment that has gone through the 
rulemaking process, Congress retains the power to enact Evidence Rules outside 
the rulemaking process, by direct statutory action. And Congress has acted 
directly on a number of occasions. For example, in 1984, after John Hinckley, 
Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity for his attempt to assassinate 
President Reagan,122 Congress added Rule 704(b) to the Evidence Rules to 
 
120 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2012). 
121 How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works [https://perma.cc/AA2R-
N2W7] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
122 See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), clarified, 529 F. Supp. 
520 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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provide that an expert in a criminal case may not express an opinion that the 
defendant did or did not have the requisite mental state to commit a crime.123 In 
1994, Congress acted directly in an unusual way—enacting a proposed 
amendment to Rule 412 that was rejected by the Supreme Court before it reached 
Congress in the Enabling Act process.124 Also in 1994, Congress directly added 
Rules 413-415 to the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow broader admissibility 
of a defendant’s prior acts of sexual assault or child molestation.125 
In addition to adopting these amendments to the Rules, Congress also 
provided significant input on the original Federal Rules of Evidence, making 
many changes to the Rules as drafted by the Advisory Committee and approved 
by the Supreme Court.126 As a result of this significant congressional tinkering, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence were ultimately enacted by statute.127 
Congressional rejection of the proposed privilege provisions was discussed 
above.128 Some other notable examples of congressional tinkering include Rule 
609, governing the impeachment of witnesses with prior convictions, and Rule 
801(d)(1)(A), governing substantive admissibility of a witness’s prior 
inconsistent statements.129 
In updating the Rules, rulemakers grapple with the appropriate degree of 
deference to afford rules that were directly enacted—or significantly altered in 
the original process—by Congress. The practice of the Evidence Advisory 
Committee has been to err on the side of deference to Congress.130 Very few 
amendments have touched rules directly enacted by or significantly altered in 
 
123 Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012)). 
124 See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 28, at 412-28. 
125 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 320935, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012)). Of course, Rule 502 was 
directly enacted by Congress in 2008 because the Enabling Act requires that all rules of 
privilege must be directly enacted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b). 
126 See CAPRA, supra note 47, at 268. 
127 See Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
128 See supra Section I.C. 
129 For an account of the back-and-forth in Congress over Rule 609(a)(1), see 28 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6131 (2012). For an 
account of the Congressional input on Rule 801(d)(1)(A), see Daniel J. Capra, Prior 
Statements of Testifying Witnesses: Drafting Choices to Eliminate or Loosen the Strictures of 
the Hearsay Rule, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 1437 (2016). 
130 See Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra note 43, at 28 (refusing to propose 
amendment to Rule 609(a)(1) in large part because deference is given to compromise worked 
out in Congress forty-five years earlier); Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the 
Meeting of April 17, 2015, at 5-7 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of April 17, 2015], 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-04-evidence-minutes_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y4JX-QQDR] (refusing to proceed with amendment to time periods for 
notice in Rules 413-415 out of deference to Congress). 
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Congress, and those that have did not disturb substantive congressional 
compromises.131  
This long-standing practice of deference notwithstanding, it is doubtful that a 
rule should receive special deference solely because of its congressional lineage. 
First, even assuming that Congress is entitled to some special deference, that 
should not completely bar reconsideration of rules that were enacted forty-four 
years ago. As examined above, our system of litigation is constantly evolving 
and rules that may have functioned well in 1975 may no longer serve the 
interests of justice.132 Where there is no indication that Congress is considering 
modifications to a particular rule to keep pace with the contemporary climate, 
the hands of the deputized rulemaking Committees should not be tied by ancient 
congressional compromises that may not reflect modern litigation imperatives 
or even modern congressional thinking on the topic. The Enabling Act means 
that Congress is relying upon the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee to monitor the Federal Rules of Evidence and to propose 
necessary reforms. If Congress does not monitor evidentiary problems in 
reliance on the Advisory Committee, and the Advisory Committee does not 
propose needed reforms in cases where Congress had a hand in crafting the 
original standard, there is a class of rules frozen in place.133 The Advisory 
Committee cannot fulfill its legislatively created responsibility if it must turn a 
blind eye to malfunctioning evidence rules solely because Congress had a hand 
in hammering out the applicable standard over forty years ago. 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Judicial Conference 
rulemaking process produces results that are superior to those achieved when 
Congress acts on its own. The Enabling Act implicitly recognizes that Congress 
is not the optimal venue for developing highly specialized evidentiary 
provisions.134 The Advisory Committee is made up of experienced federal 
judges and practitioners who are uniquely suited to determine which procedural 
rules will operate most effectively in a court proceeding. The Committee Notes 
that accompany rules enacted through the rulemaking process assist litigants in 
better understanding the operation of the Rules. Further, the rulemaking process 
is deliberate and inclusive, carefully gathering feedback and data from the public 
comment process, as well as from the Standing Committee, the Judicial 
 
131 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 101 restyled rules committee’s note to 2011 amendment, 
reproduced in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 7 (stating 
that restyled rules do not alter substance or sacred phrases); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) advisory 
committee’s note to 1990 amendment (amending Rule only to respond to Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)). 
132 See, e.g., supra Section 1.C. 
133 See Symposium, supra note 3, at 740 (noting that Congress is not maintaining Evidence 
Rules because it has delegated authority to monitor Rules to Supreme Court and Judicial 
Conference and that needed updates will not happen without action by Advisory Committee). 
134 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (delegating power to Supreme Court to “prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district 
courts . . . and courts of appeals”). 
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Conference, and finally the Supreme Court. Of course, Congress sits at the end 
of the rulemaking line and is fully able to exercise its will if it so desires. 
Finally, the rulemaking process is not influenced by special interests in the 
same way that congressional action can be. As Rules 704(b) and 413-415 
illustrate, when Congress takes direct control over revising the Evidence Rules, 
it frequently adopts provisions that appear to be politically expedient—
regardless of whether they are consistent with the principles and structure 
animating the existing body of rules.135 Whatever “lobbying” does occur in the 
context of rulemaking may be tied to the costs and benefits of a proposal for a 
particular litigation constituency but is not tied directly to campaign 
contributions. The rules directly enacted by Congress have tended to be kneejerk 
political responses to specific incidents, and they have proceeded with minimal 
consideration and sometimes without a Committee Report to indicate legislative 
intent.136 
Rules 413-415, permitting evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual assaults or 
acts of child molestation, were directly enacted by Congress outside the 
rulemaking process.137 Although the liberal admissibility of past sex offenses 
authorized by these Rules provoked a great deal of controversy, even the notice 
provisions reveal the drawbacks of direct congressional action.138 In drafting the 
notice provisions for these Rules, Congress required the proponent to provide 
notice “at least 15 days before trial.”139 About twenty years after Congress 
enacted Rules 413-415, the Judicial Conference embarked on a project for 
uniform time-counting rules.140 Under these uniform rules, all time limits must 
be stated in multiples of seven days to ensure that a deadline may never fall on 
 
135 Symposium, supra note 3, at 741 (“Members of Congress are interested in the issues 
that are politically sensitive.”); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: 
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 922 
(1999) (applying public choice theory to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rulemaking process 
to conclude that legislative process is ill-equipped for optimal procedural rulemaking); Eileen 
A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 864 
(2002) (noting that “Congress clearly has an interest in the evidence rules when it suits a 
political constituency”). 
136 Congress’s direct enactment of Rules 413-415 reflects this phenomenon perfectly. See 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 28, § 413.04 (noting that Congress passed 
rules without meaningfully considering Advisory Committee’s suggestions and without 
committee report). 
137 Id. 
138 The controversy surrounding the merits of these Rules is well documented. See 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE ADMISSION 
OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 159 
F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995) (“After careful study, the Judicial Conference urges Congress to 
reconsider its decision on the policy questions underlying the new rules.”). 
139 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413(b). The multiples-of-seven approach avoids having a notice 
period end or begin on a weekend. 
140 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 6. 
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a weekend.141 While these uniform rules are not directly applicable to the 
Evidence Rules, they reflect the most contemporary wisdom regarding time 
periods stated in days within the Federal Rules. Importantly, the only notice 
periods in the Federal Rules of Evidence expressed in a specific number of days, 
apart from Rules 413-415, are Rules 412 and 803(10)—and the time periods in 
those Rules are fourteen days and seven days, consistent with the multiples-of-
seven approach to counting days.142 All the other notice provisions in the 
Evidence Rules are stated without specifying time periods.143 So, the Rule 413-
415 time periods created by Congress are not only out of line with the other 
notice provisions in the Rules, but they are also out of step with contemporary 
time-counting conventions throughout the Federal Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. There is no indication that Congress gave any serious thought to the 
fifteen-day time period and how it would interact with the other time periods in 
the Evidence Rules or in the Federal Rules more generally. And, of course, 
Congress did not have the benefit of the subsequent uniform time-counting 
project in selecting a notice period for Rules 413-415. Accordingly, there 
appears to be little reason to defer to the ill-considered and outdated fifteen-day 
period crafted by Congress. And yet, the Advisory Committee has hesitated to 
tinker with the notice provisions in Rules 413-415 out of deference to 
Congress.144 
An Advisory Committee undoubtedly ought to approach rules that bear 
congressional fingerprints with a degree of circumspection. A rules committee 
may sensibly decline to propose the “repeal” of rules recently enacted by 
Congress where legislative intent is clear, such as Rule 704(b) or the substantive 
provisions of Rules 413-415.145 Still, when a malfunctioning or outmoded rule 
originated in Congress in the 1970s, or where the legislative intent behind a 
congressionally enacted provision fails to account for or justify its incongruous 
operation, that rule should get no more deference than any other rule of evidence. 
If such inadequacies in the Evidence Rules are ever to be corrected, the Advisory 
Committee must initiate proposals to correct the deficiencies in congressionally 
enacted provisions. If Congress truly has legislative policy objectives that are at 
odds with a proposed amendment, Congress has the opportunity allotted by the 
Enabling Act to reject or redraft the proposed amendment. 
B. The Supremacy of Supreme Court Interpretation 
Like Congress, the Supreme Court possesses a dual role with respect to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Enabling Act delegates the rulemaking function 
 
141 Id. 
142 FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1)(B); FED. R. EVID. 803(10). 
143 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 807, 902(11) (requiring reasonable notice “before trial”). 
144 See Meeting Minutes of April 17, 2015, supra note 130, at 5-7. 
145 See Scallen, supra note 135, at 861-62 (“Eliminating rules passed directly by Congress, 
such as Rule 704(b) or Rules 413-415, is an impractical and impolitic suggestion.”). 
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to the Court, which has entrusted the task to the Judicial Conference.146 The 
Supreme Court thus plays a crucial role in the rulemaking process by reviewing 
the work of the Advisory Committees. The Court has the final word on whether 
to advance a proposed amendment to Congress in the penultimate step in the 
rulemaking process.147 In addition, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to 
interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence in the course of deciding an appeal. And 
it happens, although not very often, that Supreme Court precedent articulates the 
intended operation of an existing evidence rule.148 In considering potential 
modifications to a rule, therefore, an Advisory Committee must determine the 
appropriate weight to give to previous Supreme Court interpretation of that rule. 
The amount of deference to be given depends to a large extent on the type of 
analysis embodied in a Supreme Court opinion regarding a Federal Rule of 
Evidence. When the Court makes a normative judgment about a particular 
evidence rule and opines that the rule must operate in a certain manner in order 
to be viable and fair, the Advisory Committee should rightly resist amending 
that rule in a way that would be inconsistent with the Court’s analysis.149 On the 
other hand, when the Court writes in a purely descriptive fashion, merely 
explaining the way in which an existing evidence rule operates as written, the 
Advisory Committee should remain free to propose an amendment to that rule 
if research demonstrates a flaw in its operation. Differentiating between the two 
types of Supreme Court opinions can be challenging, however, and rulemakers 
too often adopt a hands-off approach with respect to any rule the Court has 
touched. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Williamson v. United States150 is a prime 
example of a holding that should not be disturbed by an amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. In that case, the Court examined Rule 804(b)(3), 
which provides a hearsay exception for statements that are contrary to a 
declarant’s pecuniary or penal interest.151 The rationale behind the against-
interest exception is that a hearsay statement that hurts the declarant’s own 
interests is trustworthy because no reasonable actor would speak to her own 
detriment unless her statement was true.152 The Supreme Court in Williamson 
 
146 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (2012). 
147 Id. § 2074. 
148 See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 155 (1995) (holding that Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) incorporates “pre-motive” requirement); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 
171 (1987) (articulating operation of Rule 104(a) in connection with coconspirator hearsay 
exception). 
149 Of course if the Court holds a rule to be unconstitutional, different considerations apply. 
See supra Section I.A. 
150 512 U.S. 594 (1994). 
151 Id. at 596 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)). 
152 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to proposed rules (“The 
circumstantial guaranty of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that 
persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good 
reason that they are true.”). 
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considered whether the Rule should admit neutral statements (statements not 
against the speaker’s interest) when made as a collateral part of an otherwise 
disserving statement.153 The majority of the Court rejected the admissibility of 
collateral neutral statements and held that Rule 804(b)(3) admits only statements 
that are themselves against the speaker’s interest.154 The majority reasoned that 
the against-interest nature of the covered statements offers the sole guarantee 
that those statements are sufficiently reliable.155 Because there is no assurance 
that a neutral statement accompanying an otherwise disserving remark is 
trustworthy, the Court cautioned that collateral neutral statements should not be 
admitted.156 
In Williamson, therefore, the Court articulated a persuasive policy 
justification for excluding collateral neutral statements. Although the Supreme 
Court, acting in its rulemaking capacity, could certainly quash any attempt to 
amend Rule 804(b)(3) to admit collateral neutral statements, the Committee, as 
the Supreme Court’s designee in the rulemaking process, would be ill-advised 
to propose an amendment directly at odds with the clear reliability-based policy 
judgment of the Court regarding the Rule.157 
Not all Supreme Court decisions that interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence 
offer such a clear judgment on the merits of a particular provision, however. 
Some opinions simply construe the text of a rule and offer a primer on its 
application as it is currently drafted. For example, in Huddleston v. United 
States,158 the Supreme Court examined the proper application of Rule 
404(b)159—the provision governing the admissibility of a defendant’s other 
 
153 Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 601 (stating that lower court “may not just assume . . . that a statement is self-
inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the 
statement implicates someone else”). 
157 Id. at 602. Even when Supreme Court interpretation of a Rule may reflect a policy 
choice, rulemakers may nonetheless propose an amendment to the Rule while showing 
deference to the Court by retaining the specific rule text interpreted by the Court. The 2014 
amendment to the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) hearsay exception for prior consistent statements did 
exactly that. The amendment was designed to simplify and rationalize the hearsay rule by 
making all rehabilitative prior consistent statements admissible for their truth and could have 
been drafted to say just that (the height of elegant simplicity). Drafting the amendment in that 
seemingly lean and clean manner would have required dropping the original language from 
the rule, however, which was the focal point of Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), 
one of the few Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead of 
deleting the original language interpreted by the Court, therefore, the Committee chose to 
retain the original language and to add a new subsection to expand substantive admissibility 
of prior consistent statements. 
158 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
159 Id. at 681. 
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crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove points such as intent, knowledge, or motive.160 
In Huddleston, the defendant denied committing the prior bad acts that the 
government was seeking to admit. Thus, the question in Huddleston concerned 
the proper standard of proof for determining whether a defendant had, in fact, 
committed a prior bad act offered under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court found 
that this preliminary question was one of conditional relevance—the relevance 
of the prior bad act being conditioned on whether the defendant actually 
committed it. As such, the preliminary finding is controlled by Rule 104(b), 
meaning that a judge merely screens the evidence of the prior bad act to 
determine whether a reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant committed the prior bad act.161 In responding to the 
defendant’s argument that a higher standard was needed to protect defendants 
from unfair prejudice, the Court outlined the operation of Rule 404(b) as 
follows:  
We think, however, that the protection against such unfair prejudice 
emanates not from a requirement of a preliminary finding by the trial court, 
but rather from four other sources: first, from the requirement of Rule 
404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the 
relevancy requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 104(b); 
third, from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to 
determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and fourth, 
from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that the trial court 
shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 
considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.162 
In so doing, the Court noted the role that Rule 403 plays in balancing the 
probative value of a prior bad act against the unfair prejudice to a defendant in 
the Federal Rules’ scheme. 
The Advisory Committee recently explored the possibility of amending Rule 
404(b) to protect defendants from the permissive admission of prior bad acts in 
federal criminal trials.163 Such an amendment would have been aimed at 
correcting a conflict in the circuits, as well as at remedying injustice in the 
application of Rule 404(b). One amendment alternative was the addition of a 
heightened balancing test to require the probative value of prior bad acts offered 
against criminal defendants under Rule 404(b) to outweigh any unfair 
prejudice.164 This balancing test would offer defendants slightly more protection 
than the standard Rule 403 balancing by favoring exclusion (rather than 
 
160 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
161 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (providing that when relevance of evidence is conditioned on 
the existence of a fact, the standard of proof for the conditional fact is evidence “sufficient to 
support a finding that the fact does exist”). 
162 Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 681-82 (citations and footnote omitted). 
163 See Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra note 43, at 18-24. 
164 See Capra & Richter, supra note 79, at 832. 
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admission) of such evidence.165 The DOJ argued that such a balancing 
amendment would improperly “overrule” the Supreme Court’s Huddleston 
opinion to the extent that it imposed a standard different from the Rule 403 
balancing test described by the Court.166 
But a heightened balancing test simply would have substituted one of the 
protections referred to by the Supreme Court (Rule 403) for a more protective 
balancing test. That switch would not have overruled anything in Huddleston 
because the Court was merely describing the protections provided by the rules 
in existence at the time. Nowhere does the Court suggest that the protections 
could not or should not be strengthened. Indeed, a heightened balancing test 
might be embraced by a Court that was trying to emphasize needed protections 
for a criminal defendant. Thus, the Advisory Committee would have been acting 
well within its jurisdiction in proposing a contemporary balancing test to 
increase protections for criminal defendants in light of permissive trends in the 
federal precedent.167 
A Federal Rule of Evidence does not become written on a stone tablet simply 
because the Supreme Court has explained its operation. Accordingly, an 
Advisory Committee should carefully assess the nature of any Supreme Court 
precedent regarding a particular rule before deciding that a valuable amendment 
is foreclosed by that precedent.  
C. Realpolitik: Effective Rulemaking and the Role of the DOJ 
There are many stakeholders in the rulemaking process and accommodating 
the interests of all of them is a tall order. When the stakeholder is the DOJ, 
however, the dynamics of the rulemaking process change entirely. Although the 
DOJ holds only one position on the Evidence Advisory Committee and on the 
Standing Committee, the DOJ obviously has influence beyond the confines of 
the rulemaking process. Because the DOJ can influence Congress directly, its 
leverage in the rulemaking process is considerable.168 Simply put, if the DOJ 
 
165 FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring that risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweigh 
probative value before evidence may be excluded). 
166 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 26, 2017, 
at 10, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-10-26-evidence_rules_minutes_0 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8653-K2CL] (stating that DOJ “suggested that a modification of the 
balancing test was inconsistent with the will of Congress and the Supreme Court in 
Huddleston”). 
167 For more on the benefits of a stronger balancing test to protect criminal defendants 
from evidence of their uncharged misconduct, see Capra & Richter, supra note 79, at 825. 
168 The DOJ has occasionally hinted that it would seek relief in Congress if an amendment 
before the Committee was approved. See, e.g., Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra 
note 43, at 20 (“Mr. Hur cautioned that Congress may get involved if the Committee chose to 
pursue an amendment limiting admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence.”). 
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opposes a proposed amendment on any plausible ground, the chances of that 
proposal progressing to the next stage are very slim indeed.169 
This realpolitik should not prevent an Advisory Committee from exploring 
amendments justified by the important considerations outlined in Part I of this 
Article simply because they appear contrary to the interests of the DOJ. First and 
foremost, the DOJ is, of course, charged with pursuing “justice” and may 
support a proposed amendment that runs counter to its litigating interests when 
it is demonstrably and undeniably fair. An example is the 2010 amendment to 
Rule 804(b)(3)—the hearsay exception for declarations against interest. With 
respect to declarations against penal interest, the original Rule required only 
criminal defendants seeking to admit against-interest hearsay to show 
“corroborating circumstances clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness” of the 
statement.170 There was no similar requirement placed on the prosecution.171 
There was no rational reason for this evidentiary disparity. It arose as a result of 
a misconception in Congress and a miscommunication with the original 
Advisory Committee.172 In light of the blatant double standard, many courts had 
refused to tolerate the inexplicable comparative disadvantage to the criminal 
defendant. These courts required the government to establish corroborating 
circumstances as well, even though the plain language of the Rule did not.173 
Under these circumstances, although the 2010 amendment to Rule 804(b)(3) that 
leveled the playing field imposed a new burden on the prosecution, the DOJ 
supported it.174 
Furthermore, even an amendment proposal that is ultimately defeated by DOJ 
opposition may set the stage for important improvements to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. As discussed above, from 2017-2018, the Committee considered a 
proposal to add a more protective balancing test for criminal defendants under 
Rule 404(b). The proposal was generated by contemporary circuit precedent 
questioning the long-standing tradition of permitting almost automatic 
 
169 Symposium, supra note 3, at 747, 749 (equating DOJ to “800 pound gorilla as far as 
federal litigation is concerned,” pointing out “heated discussions” with DOJ representatives 
over amendment proposals, and providing examples of proposals that failed due to DOJ 
opposition). 
170 The original Rule 804(b)(3) is reproduced in RICHARD FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: TEXT AND HISTORY 426 (2015). 
171 Id. 
172 For a description of the missteps that led to the disparity, see generally Peter W. Tague, 
Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of 
Rule 804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981). 
173 See, e.g., United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying 
corroboration requirement to government-offered statements). 
174 See Meeting Minutes of April 23-24, 2009, supra note 9, at 89 (“As it had on a number 
of previous occasions, the Committee (including the DOJ representative) unanimously agreed 
with the substantive result mandated by the amendment, i.e., that the government will have to 
provide corroborating circumstances before a declaration against penal interest can be 
admitted by the accused.”). 
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admissibility of prior-bad-act evidence in criminal cases.175 The DOJ was 
predictably opposed to such an amendment because it would create a higher 
obstacle for prosecutors to surmount in seeking admission of prior-bad-act 
evidence.176 After almost two years of dialogue regarding the appropriate 
standard for the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, the DOJ countered the 
substantive balancing proposal with a proposed amendment that would enhance 
the Rule 404(b) notice requirements in favor of criminal defendants. The 
amended notice provision would require a prosecutor to provide defense counsel 
with much greater specificity regarding the Rule 404(b) evidence she intends to 
offer, demanding that a prosecutor “articulate in the notice the non-propensity 
purpose for which the prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning 
supporting the purpose.”177 The notice proposal was approved by the Advisory 
Committee and released for a period of public comment on August 15, 2018.178 
If adopted, the notice provision may bring some additional protection for 
criminal defendants—the government will have to explain precisely how a 
defendant’s uncharged bad act is probative of anything other than his propensity 
to commit crime, enabling defendants to be more prepared to argue for the 
exclusion of Rule 404(b) evidence.179 Thus, the Advisory Committee’s 
willingness to explore a substantive amendment to Rule 404(b) that was certain 
to be unpalatable to the DOJ led to an alternative notice proposal that may move 
the needle in the direction of improved safeguards—if not all the way to the 
optimal destination. 
Finally, as explored in Part III of this Article, effective rulemakers may be 
able to craft compromise remedies for defects in evidentiary standards that can 
garner the support, or at least the tolerance, of the DOJ. With patience and 
dialogue, victory is often snatched from the jaws of potential defeat and 
amendment proposals can be formulated such that all stakeholders are able to 
approve. 
In sum, the DOJ has a powerful voice in the rulemaking process, as well as 
significant influence in Congress. Proposed amendments that are perceived as 
disadvantageous to the government’s litigating posture may face strong 
headwinds. Still, a rulemaker should not be deterred from proposing fair and 
helpful amendments that will be opposed by the DOJ. If the Rules are improved 
by the effort, the objective of sound rulemaking is advanced. 
 
175 See Capra & Richter, supra note 79, at 790-802 (discussing case law). 
176 See Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra note 43, at 21-22. 
177 See id. at 23. 
178 See Proposed Amendments Published for Public Comment, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/proposed-amendments-published-public-comment 
[https://perma.cc/PF35-36WJ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019) (demonstrating open comment 
period from August 15, 2018, to February 15, 2019). 
179 Id. 
  
2019] POETRY IN MOTION 1913 
 
III. ACHIEVING CONSTRUCTIVE EVIDENTIARY REFORM:  
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CRAFTING AN AMENDMENT 
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, there are compelling 
circumstances in which the Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended 
despite the dislocation costs that can accompany changes. But even when 
modifications to the Rules are needed, there are inherent barriers to change that 
must be confronted. There are certain fundamental drafting techniques and tools 
that an Advisory Committee should utilize to minimize the costs and barriers 
associated with rules amendments. 
A. Something Borrowed: Taking Advantage of Established Language 
When it comes to amending the Federal Rules of Evidence, something 
borrowed is often better than something new. Terminology and tests that are new 
to an established body of rules create significant transaction costs. Judges and 
litigants are likely to expend considerable resources determining the contours of 
a new standard foreign to the code. Further, courts may interpret an unfamiliar 
standard erroneously notwithstanding seemingly artful drafting. There is even a 
threat to the settled meaning of existing terminology if distinct terminology is 
selected to implement a similar concept. These risks and costs are minimized 
when an amendment can borrow from recognized phraseology in another rule. 
There are many examples of profitable language-borrowing in amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence. A leading example is Rule 502(a) which, as 
discussed above, was enacted in 2008 to help reduce the escalating costs of 
privilege review driven by the sudden explosion of ESI.180 Rule 502(a) governs 
the issue of subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege—a waiver that 
extends not only to privileged information that has been disclosed outside the 
confidential attorney-client relationship, but also to all other nondisclosed 
privileged information on the same subject matter.181 The threat of a broad 
subject matter waiver strikes fear in the heart of any lawyer and incentivizes 
exhaustive privilege review to avoid any disclosure that might give rise to such 
a waiver. In adopting a Federal Rule of Evidence regarding subject matter 
waiver, therefore, the intent was to reject federal precedent that encouraged 
excessive and wasteful privilege review costs in pre-trial discovery.182 
 
180 See supra Section I.C. 
181 Rule 502(a) provides that a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product 
protection as to a disclosed communication will operate as a waiver with respect to 
undisclosed communications when: “(1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and 
undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they 
ought in fairness to be considered together.” FED. R. EVID. 502(a); see supra notes 86-89 and 
accompanying text. 
182 See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 1034 (noting 
intent to limit doctrine of subject matter waiver); see also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 
981 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that waiver of attorney-client privilege resulting from 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information “extends ‘to all other communications 
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In studying subject matter waiver, the Committee determined that the 
punishment should fit the crime. Because a broad waiver of all privileged 
communications on a topic is such a severe sanction, the Committee concluded 
that it should not flow from a purely inadvertent disclosure. Furthermore, 
permitting subject matter waiver after an inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
information would perpetuate and indeed exacerbate the escalating costs of 
privilege review in the era of voluminous e-discovery. Accordingly, the 
Advisory Committee decided that subject matter waivers should be found only 
when the holder of the privilege intentionally uses its own privileged 
information in an unfair way to disadvantage the adversary. The classic example 
is an intentional disclosure made to advance an advice of counsel defense. A 
privilege holder should not be permitted to disclose some self-serving privileged 
information purposely, only to turn around and invoke privilege for related 
information that may aid the adversary in countering the defense.183 
There are multiple ways to draft a rule limiting subject matter waiver to such 
circumstances. One possibility is to draft with great specificity and to authorize 
subject matter waiver only after disclosures of privileged information made to 
advance an “advice of counsel defense.”184 Alternatively, an amendment could 
be drafted more broadly to allow subject matter waiver following intentional 
disclosures that “disadvantage the adversary.”185 Using broader language would 
capture the advice-of-counsel scenario but could also potentially extend to 
unforeseen unfair uses of privileged information beyond that specific defense. 
But clarifying the reach of such amorphous terminology for courts and litigants 
may have been an impossible task. If an adversary might benefit from securing 
additional privileged information after an initial privileged disclosure, does that 
mean that the adversary is “disadvantaged” by the limited disclosure? That 
interpretation—although a plausible reading of “disadvantage the adversary”—
would be broader than the Committee intended. 
In searching for terminology to capture clearly the situations in which it 
intended subject matter waiver to operate, the Committee found an analog in the 
rule of completeness already codified in Rule 106. Rule 106 applies when a party 
introduces a portion of a writing or recording in such a way that it misleads the 
trier of fact. Rule 106 allows the adversary to insist upon the introduction of the 
remainder of the writing or recording to restore the fair meaning of the 
 
relating to the same subject matter’” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 
1982))). 
183 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 24-25, 2006, 
at 6-8 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of April 24-25, 2006], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites 
/default/files/fr_import/EV04-2006-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX4C-Y7HP] (discussing 
limitations on Rule 502, attorney-client privilege, and work product). 
184 Id. at 7. 
185 Id. 
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statement.186 Further, Rule 106 provides that an adversary can demand 
completion where the remainder of the writing or recording “ought in fairness” 
to be introduced.187 Federal courts have found that Rule 106 “‘functions as a 
defensive shield against potentially misleading evidence proffered by an 
opposing party.’ Only the portions of a statement that are relevant to an issue in 
the case and necessary to explain or clarify the already-admitted portions need 
be admitted.”188  
This Rule 106 principle protects a litigant from unfair distortion of evidence 
to which only an adversary has initial access and mirrors the principle the 
Advisory Committee sought to advance regarding subject matter waiver of 
privilege. Rather than crafting new terminology foreign to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to convey the intended and limited application of subject matter 
waiver, the Committee borrowed the recognized Rule 106 “ought in fairness” 
standard—already backed by existing federal precedent—for Rule 502(a). 
Carrying this familiar language over to the newly enacted rule provided 
consumers of the Federal Rules with the background necessary to understand 
the intended scope of Rule 502(a). To the extent that a judge or litigant 
examining Rule 502(a) for the first time does not recognize the Rule 106 
standard that it utilizes, the Committee Note seals the deal by referring 
specifically to Rule 106.189 By drawing upon existing terminology with an 
accepted meaning, the Advisory Committee was able to make a needed reform 
to the Rules with minimal risk of misinterpretation.190 
There are additional opportunities for successful borrowing in the ongoing 
effort to advance the Federal Rules of Evidence that have yet to be adopted due 
to reluctance to alter time-honored Evidence Rules. As noted above, Rule 404(b) 
offers another borrowing possibility. Prosecutors frequently rely on Rule 404(b) 
 
186 Rule 106 provides: “If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, 
an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other 
writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” On 
the operation of Rule 106, see generally Michael A. Hardin, Note, This Space Intentionally 
Left Blank: What to Do When Hearsay and Rule 106 Completeness Collide, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1283 (2013). 
187 As a result of the 2011 restyling, Rule 106 currently states that completion is required 
for a remainder “that in fairness ought to be considered.” FED. R. EVID. 106. 
188 United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1038 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th 
Cir. 2001)). 
189 See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee’s explanatory note to rule 502 (“The 
language concerning subject matter waiver—‘ought in fairness’—is taken from Rule 106, 
because the animating principle is the same. Under both Rules, a party that makes a selective, 
misleading presentation that is unfair to the adversary opens itself to a more complete and 
accurate presentation.”). 
190 There are many other examples of successful borrowing in the Rules. The 2018 
proposal to amend Rule 807, for example, appropriated language from Rule 103. See Meeting 
Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra note 43, at 10-11. 
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to admit evidence of a criminal defendant’s past crimes.191 Once a trial court 
determines that such a crime is relevant to prove something other than the 
defendant’s bad character, the forgiving Rule 403 balancing test that favors 
admissibility currently offers the only safeguard for defendants.192 There has 
been growing concern about the ease with which prejudicial evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s past misdeeds is paraded before the jury and the proper 
application of Rule 404(b) is the subject of a circuit split.193 
A prime opportunity exists to protect against liberal admissibility of the past 
crimes of criminal defendants by borrowing language for Rule 404(b) that 
currently exists in Rule 609(a)(1)(B). Rule 609(a)(1)(B) governs the 
admissibility of a criminal defendant’s prior felony convictions for the limited 
purpose of impeaching the truthfulness of the defendant’s trial testimony.194 
When a felony conviction is offered to impeach a testifying criminal defendant, 
the conviction is admissible only if its probative value in illustrating the 
defendant’s truthfulness outweighs the prejudicial effect of the prior criminal 
conduct.195 This specialized balancing test was crafted by Congress when the 
Rules were enacted after significant deliberation and debate.196 The balancing 
test applicable under Rule 609(a)(1) provides criminal defendants with greater 
protection against bad-character reasoning than the Rule 403 balancing test by 
demanding that the legitimate probative value of the conviction eclipse its unfair 
and prejudicial effect. The difference in balancing between Rules 404(b) and 
609(a)(1)(B) is unjustified because the two Rules protect criminal defendants 
from the same potential unfairness—the risk that a defendant will be convicted 
for who he is and for what he has done in the past.197 Amending Rule 404(b) to 
add the special balancing test that Congress devised for criminal defendants in 
Rule 609(a)(1)(B) would deploy a familiar and well-considered evidentiary 
standard to resolve contemporary defects in the operation of Rule 404(b).198 
 
191 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (allowing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes 
such as proving “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 
of mistake, or lack of accident”). 
192 FED. R. EVID. 403. For a discussion of Rule 404(b) and its relationship with Rule 403 
balancing, see generally Capra & Richter, supra note 79. 
193 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(discussing and disapproving of liberal admission of defendants’ prior crimes under Rule 
404(b)). 
194 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). 
195 Id. 
196 For a discussion of the extensive legislative history behind Rule 609(a)(1), see Jeffrey 
Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching 
Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 318 (2008). 
197 Capra & Richter, supra note 79, at 829-31. 
198 This borrowing proposal has not been adopted by the Advisory Committee. See 
Meeting Minutes of April 26-27, 2018, supra note 43, at 23. For another potential 
improvement to the Rules through borrowing, see Liesa L. Richter, Goldilocks and the Rule 
803 Hearsay Exceptions, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 930 (2018) (proposing expansion of 
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B. The Importance of Committee Notes 
One of the principal arguments against amending the Rules is the threat to 
their clarity and brevity created by constant and complicated modifications to 
rule text. In fulfilling its important obligation to maintain the contemporary 
integrity of the Rules, the Advisory Committee may utilize the power of 
Committee Notes to tackle the complexity of the evidentiary issues addressed 
by an amendment while retaining concise and straightforward rule text. 
Advisory notes are required by statute. According to 42 U.S.C. § 2073(d), any 
recommendation made pursuant to the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority 
must contain “a proposed rule” and “an explanatory note on the rule.”199 Because 
it suggests that a rulemaking proposal should contain both a proposed rule and 
a note, that statute—fairly read—prevents a Rules Committee from retroactively 
amending a Committee Note without amending the rule.200 Thus, the drafter gets 
one shot at providing all necessary insight into the operation of a rule and may 
not correct future problems in the operation of a rule with additions to a 
Committee Note alone. Committee Notes come in different shapes and sizes and 
may be used effectively in service of multiple rulemaking objectives. A 
Committee Note may serve to explain the rule with detailed and lengthy 
language—and citations—that would be unacceptable in rule text. It can instruct 
the courts on the exercise of discretion, without binding that discretion in rigid 
rules. And a Committee Note can highlight the limits of any amendment, 
clarifying what an amendment does not do. 
Probably the best example of a detailed Committee Note designed to support 
a concise amendment to rule text is the Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 
702, governing the admissibility of expert testimony.201 In 1993, the Supreme 
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,202 requiring 
federal trial judges to act as gatekeepers to prevent unreliable scientific expert 
 
trustworthiness exception in Rules 803(6) and 803(8) to other Rule 803 hearsay exceptions to 
create symmetry in operation of Rule 803 exceptions and to solve perceived problems in some 
applications of certain exceptions). 
199 42 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2012). 
200 The report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 144 (2016), recommends that the Advisory Committee develop a 
Committee Note concerning procedures for evaluating the scientific validity of forensic 
feature-comparison methods. Because a Committee Note cannot be promulgated independent 
of a rule change, the Advisory Committee is currently considering whether to amend the 
Federal Rules to further regulate forensic evidence. Any new Committee Note would 
accompany that amendment. See Meeting Minutes of April 24-25, 2006, supra note 183, at 
6-8. 
201 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 20-21, 
1997, at 5-6 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of October 20-21, 1997], https://www.uscourts.gov 
/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV10-1997-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV9R-R65W]. 
202 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (outlining factors for federal trial judges to consider in 
evaluating reliability of expert testimony). 
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testimony from infecting the trial process. In so doing, the Court provided a 
nonexhaustive list of factors, including factors traditionally associated with 
scientific opinion, such as peer review and potential error rate, for district judges 
to evaluate in assessing the reliability of expert testimony.203 Then in 1999, in 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,204 the Court clarified that the trial court’s 
gatekeeper role applies to the evaluation of all expert opinion testimony and not 
only to scientific-opinion evidence.205 Consistent with the need to maintain the 
contemporary accuracy of the Rules, the Advisory Committee proposed an 
amendment to Rule 702 to memorialize this gatekeeping role succinctly in the 
rule text. The 2000 amendment to Rule 702 clarified that its requirements apply 
to all types of expert testimony, whether based on “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.”206 It further highlighted the trial court’s duty to assess 
the “sufficiency” of the facts and data upon which an expert relies, as well as the 
reliability of her methodology and of her application of that methodology to the 
facts of the particular case.207 
Notwithstanding the concise mandate of amended Rule 702, the Advisory 
Committee anticipated that trial courts would continue to wrestle with the 
significant details underlying a reliability analysis of expert opinion testimony. 
Accordingly, the Committee determined that a comprehensive Committee Note 
could illuminate several matters that could not be included in the text of Rule 
702. The Committee determined that a thorough Note was especially warranted 
because Daubert was somewhat conflicting in its meaning. 208 For example, the 
Daubert Court required a trial judge to make her gatekeeping findings under a 
Rule 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard.209 Although this tasked 
trial judges with determining the reliability of expert testimony before 
submitting it to the jury, the Daubert Court stated—somewhat contradictorily—
that cross-examination before the jury and the battle of competing experts 
 
203 Id. at 593-94 (citing testability, peer review and publication, error rate, standards and 
controls, and general acceptance as factors to be considered in evaluating expert’s 
methodology and opinion). 
204 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (establishing judiciary’s role in assessment of all expert opinions). 
205 Id. at 138 (establishing judiciary’s role in assessment of all expert opinions). 
206 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
207 FED. R. EVID. 702(b), (d). 
208 See Meeting Minutes of October 20-21, 1997, supra note 201, at 5-6 (“After a general 
discussion, the Committee agreed that some amendment to Rule 702 should be proposed, in 
light of the conflicts created by Daubert, and the importance of the issue to courts and 
litigants . . . . Members expressed the opinion that the Committee could perform a valuable 
service by setting forth some general standards that would guide a trial court in determining 
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable . . . . Finally, it was generally agreed that any 
amendment to Rule 702 should not be excessively long or detailed. No rule could attempt to 
include all the factors that should be considered in assessing the trustworthiness of all types 
of expert testimony. It was agreed that any details or elaborations on general principles should 
be left for the Advisory Committee Note.”). 
209 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
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ordinarily offer the best approach to expert testimony.210 The Committee Note 
provided insight into what Daubert meant by articulating the trial judge’s 
obligation to find the Rule 702 requirements satisfied before allowing a battle of 
competing experts in front of the jury.211 The Note explained the factors that 
Daubert had listed and identified additional factors that may prove helpful to 
trial judges exercising the gatekeeper function. The Note cautioned that trial 
judges should exercise the same care in evaluating nonscientific expert 
testimony as they do in evaluating expert opinion testimony based on traditional 
scientific principles. It also explained the quantitative nature of the requirement 
of sufficient underlying facts or data for an expert’s opinion and noted the trial 
judge’s flexibility in designing appropriate procedures for the consideration of 
expert opinion testimony. Finally, the Note cited numerous federal cases and 
law review articles examining the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. 
Thus, the Advisory Committee crafted a concise and straightforward 
amendment to the text of Rule 702 to bring it into alignment with evolving 
Supreme Court precedent, and it utilized a comprehensive Committee Note to 
help courts and litigants master the post-Daubert tsunami of case law, and to 
process that rapidly evolving precedent in a comprehensive review of the subject 
that would be inappropriate for inclusion in Rule text. The Committee Note to 
the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 has been relied upon more than 1400 times in 
reported federal decisions, suggesting that it is serving its intended purpose of 
lighting the path for consumers of Rule 702.212 
A Committee Note can also be employed to clarify what an amendment does 
not do to prevent the disruption feared by Chief Justice Rehnquist when an 
Evidence Rule is altered.213 A Committee Note can offer insurance against an 
overbroad reading of an amendment that might be extrapolated from the text 
alone. For example, the 2014 amendment simplifying the hearsay exception214 
for prior consistent statements in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was drafted to retain the 
language of the original provision—i.e., making a prior consistent statement 
admissible substantively “to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant 
recently fabricated” trial testimony or “acted from a recent improper influence 
or motive.”215 The amendment simply added a new subsection admitting prior 
consistent statements for their truth when offered to rehabilitate a witness 
 
210 Id. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky 
but admissible evidence.”). 
211 See Meeting Minutes of October 20-21, 1997, supra note 201, at 5-6. 
212 This statistic was confirmed with a Westlaw search on August 2, 2018. 
213 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
214 Of course, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is technically not an “exception” per se, but operates to 
the same effect. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (defining statements that are “not hearsay”). 
215 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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attacked on some basis other than recent fabrication or improper motive.216 The 
Supreme Court, in Tome v. United States,217 had held that the prior consistent 
statement must have been made before the charged motive to falsify arose to be 
admissible under the original Rule. By incorporating the original language into 
a broader amended provision, the rule text created a potential question as to 
whether the amended version of the Rule contemplated any change in that time-
honored meaning of the original language. Because the language the Court 
construed was not changed by the 2014 amendment, the text could be fairly read 
to retain the pre-motive requirement when a consistent statement was offered to 
rebut a charge of bad motive. But to avoid any speculation on the matter, the 
Committee Note squarely addressed the Tome pre-motive question, stating that 
the amendment “retains the requirement set forth in Tome v. United States.”218 
That same Committee Note makes another important point about the limits of 
the amendment by clarifying that it in no way expands the admissibility of prior 
consistent statements for rehabilitative purposes. Instead, as the Note explains, 
the amendment merely makes those prior consistent statements already 
admissible for rehabilitation under existing law also admissible for their truth.219 
Thus, Committee Notes may be employed to prevent unintended and overbroad 
interpretations of an amended provision. 
Notwithstanding the many beneficial uses to which Committee Notes may be 
put, the past decade has seen an emerging debate in the Rules committees about 
the type of information that should be included in a Committee Note. Some have 
argued that notes should be spare, and that a note should extend no further than 
the text of a rule. According to this view, the optimal Committee Note is five 
words long: “The Rule speaks for itself.” The argument supporting this narrow 
view is, essentially, that the role of the Committee is to propose rules, not 
notes.220 Under this view, a Committee Note may, perhaps, explain what the rule 
does not do and a little about what the rule actually accomplishes, but it cannot 
refer to or resolve a matter that goes beyond the text of the rule. For example, 
 
216 For discussion of the amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B), see supra notes 110-115 and 
accompanying text. 
217 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995). 
218 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendment. The 
Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 103, designed to provide some 
protection against waiver of an evidentiary objection, makes a similar attempt to avoid an 
overbroad application by stating that there is no attempt to affect Supreme Court-imposed 
requirements on preserving a claim of error for appeal. FED. R. EVID. 103 advisory 
committee’s notes to 2000 amendment. 
219 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendment. 
220 See, e.g., Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting of June 
11-12, 2007, at 4, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST06-2007-min.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3CMW-72AT] (noting that “Judge Thrash . . . played a vital role in shaping 
the way that committee notes are written, believing that they should normally be short and to 
the point”); id. at 46 (debating propriety of lengthy Committee Note for Rule 502 and 
advocating brevity). 
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under this truncated view, a Committee Note should not list relevant factors that 
a court should take into account in applying the rule—as does the comprehensive 
Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 702.221 And it should never 
opine on an evidentiary rule that is not part of the accompanying rule text. 
Proponents of this austere view also object to citations to cases, statutes, articles, 
or treatises. Because Committee Notes are forever, some frown on citing cases 
that can be overruled, statutes that can be repealed, and articles and treatises that 
can become out of date. 
The contrary view is that the notes are the Advisory Committee’s one 
opportunity to help consumers of the Rules read between the lines and solve 
foreseeable problems in the implementation of the Rules. Many foreseeable 
complexities in applying a particular rule simply cannot be resolved through rule 
text. For example, the Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 sets 
forth a list of factors that could not be embodied in Rule 702 itself, but that courts 
may properly consider in determining the reliability of proffered expert 
testimony.222 Though a list containing as many factors as are potentially 
appropriate to assess the wide array of expertise seen in federal litigation would 
undermine the simplicity of the rule and might be read to improperly limit 
judicial discretion, the factors can be quite helpful as background guidance in a 
Committee Note that also explains the trial court’s discretion and flexibility in 
selecting appropriate factors in a given case. This is not to say that every 
Committee Note should be written as a treatise. But it is to say that a terse, 
Delphic note squanders the only opportunity for the body that drafted the rule to 
offer helpful guidance. 
The more expansive view of Committee Notes also embraces the use of cases, 
statutes, articles, and treatises to educate litigants and judges. These sources are 
needed to illustrate and provide foundation for the instruction provided by the 
note. They allow the reader to delve deeper into the problems and nuances 
addressed in a note and to see how the principles discussed actually apply in 
particular cases. They also show that the Committee is not simply speaking ex 
cathedra—i.e., that the point being made has support in the federal cases and 
authorities. The numerous citations to post-Daubert precedent in the Committee 
Note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 were included for just these reasons.223  
It is true that citing sources runs the risk that some sources will become 
obsolete. The poster child for this unfortunate phenomenon is the original 
 
221 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (listing Daubert 
factors and other factors that courts pre- and post-Daubert have found relevant in determining 
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered). 
222 See id. 
223 See id. (reviewing post-Daubert case law and noting that “[a]ll of these factors remain 
relevant to the determination of the reliability of expert testimony under the Rule as 
amended”); Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 12-13, 
1999, at 7, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/499minEV.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N9Y6-MU2V] (resolving to add specific language and supporting authority 
to Committee Note in response to public comments). 
  
1922 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1873 
 
Advisory Committee’s extensive note on the relationship between the hearsay 
rule and the Confrontation Clause. Given all the significant case law 
developments on confrontation since the 1970s, this mini-treatise on the 
intersection between hearsay and the Constitution now holds historical interest 
only.224 But federal cases interpreting and applying Evidence Rules—as 
opposed to constitutional doctrines—are much less likely to be overruled or to 
become outdated. Moreover, case citations in Committee Notes are illustrative 
only—some might well be included to illustrate a result to be avoided. Thus, the 
risk that citations included in a Committee Note may become outmoded is 
overstated and inadequate to justify stripping all helpful source material from 
the Committee Notes. 
Boiled down to its essence, the recent debate over the role of Committee 
Notes is about whether those notes should be helpful and constructive or whether 
they should abandon litigants to the language of the accompanying rule. One of 
the principal strengths of the Evidence Rules is their reliance on straightforward 
and concise provisions. In crafting necessary updates, rulemakers may ensure 
the continued brevity of the Rules by seizing the invaluable opportunity to 
provide clear guidance in the interpretation and application of succinct standards 
through Committee Notes. 
C. If You Try Sometimes, You Just Might Find—You Get What You Need: 
Flexibility and Compromise in the Rulemaking Process 
Amendments that are necessary to protect the contemporary viability of the 
Rules or to resolve an unintended or unjust application of existing rules may 
nonetheless run square into the counterforce of tradition or the settled 
expectations of a powerful constituent like the DOJ. Flexibility and compromise 
are key characteristics of a constructive reform process that allow the 
advancement of the Rules without the needless dislocation costs decried by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.225  
1. Flexibility in Rulemaking 
The ideal amendment may not be a destination that can be preordained at the 
beginning of the rulemaking process. There is much to learn along the way to 
the appropriate solution to a perceived problem. Even subject experts may 
discover previously unappreciated nuances in a rule once they turn over every 
stone in federal and state practice while working to craft an optimal amendment. 
The problem that a committee sets out to resolve might morph into a different 
 
224 That note provided excellent guidance in 1973, but it was completely undermined by 
the Supreme Court’s shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, begun by Crawford v. 
Washington. See 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (reformulating standard for determining when 
Confrontation Clause permits admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases); see also 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 2018-2019 EDITION, supra note 90, at 173-75 (setting forth 
original note). 
225 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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problem that may be solved by a different take on the rule in question. Flexibility 
and adaptability are required in the dynamic landscape of rulemaking. 
There are many examples of amendment adaptation during the Evidence 
rulemaking process. The ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 
803(16), was amended in 2017 to account for the contemporary reality of aging 
ESI.226 That amendment constitutes a prime example of adaptability in 
rulemaking objectives because Rule 803(16) went through several twists and 
turns before arriving at its ultimate destination. The original Rule 803(16) was 
quite straightforward. It provided that any statement in a document that could be 
authenticated as over twenty years old could be admitted for its truth without 
any independent showing of the statement’s reliability.227 At the time the hearsay 
exception was drafted, the absence of any reliability requirement was not a 
source of significant concern. The common law cases generally involved a paper 
document that had been squirreled away in a trunk in someone’s attic and offered 
under circumstances in which the proponent had little alternative evidence.228 
When the Federal Rules were enacted, the very act of having preserved a 
document for over twenty years may have lent it an air of reliability. 
But the explosion of ESI as the Rules entered the twenty-first century shifted 
the ancient-documents paradigm dramatically.229 Electronically stored 
documents can be easily preserved and potentially available for use in any 
litigation to which they may be relevant. For such ESI to be admissible for its 
truth under the original Rule 803(16), a proponent needed to show only the 
authenticity of the ESI—in other words, that the ESI was what the proponent 
claimed it to be—and that it was created more than twenty years earlier. 
Although federal courts had yet to admit ESI through Rule 803(16) at the time, 
the Committee recognized in 2014 the legitimate prospect that terabytes of 
electronic information (then nearing their twentieth birthday) would soon 
become automatically admissible in federal courts through the ancient 
documents exception—without any showing of reliability or necessity.230 
 
226 FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment (“The Committee 
has determined that the ancient documents exception should be limited due to the risk that it 
will be used as a vehicle to admit vast amounts of unreliable electronically stored information 
(ESI).”). 
227 See FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 170, at 343 (providing Rule 803(16) in its original 
form). 
228 See, e.g., Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of 
Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 643 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding two letters, “both ‘in 
existence 20 years or more at the time [they were] offered’ as evidence,” admissible for their 
truth under Rule 803(16) absent other evidence that rights to dances had been assigned). 
229 FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment (“Given the 
exponential development and growth of electronic information since 1998, the hearsay 
exception for ancient documents has now become a possible open door for large amounts of 
unreliable ESI, as no showing of reliability needs to be made to qualify under the exception.”). 
230 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 24, 2014, at 
4, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/minutes_oct_2014_evidence_committee_0 
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Although the proposal to amend the exception was always directed at the 
mounting risks of massive admission of ESI, the proposed amendment that was 
published for public comment called for the abrogation of the exception 
altogether.231 Concerned that age alone failed to safeguard against unreliable 
hearsay, particularly in the context of automatically preserved electronic 
information, the Committee concluded that the simplest and most effective 
amendment would eliminate the ancient documents hearsay exception. It was 
thought that abrogation would not be unduly disruptive for two reasons. First, 
there was scant appellate precedent interpreting the exception, suggesting that it 
was not frequently invoked.232 Second, the Committee concluded that reliable, 
but older, hearsay could still be admitted through other hearsay exceptions, like 
the business records exception or the residual exception, in the absence of an 
ancient documents avenue.233  
After the Committee proposed that Rule 803(16) be abrogated,234 public 
comment emphasized the disruption that elimination of the ancient documents 
exception would cause in cases currently maintained only through old hard copy 
documents235 —cases involving latent diseases, for example, often stand or fall 
on the basis of ancient documents.236 This public comment revealed more use of 
 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/F33G-YV7H] (“On the first question of whether an amendment is 
necessary at this point: Some members argued that the obscurity of the ancient documents 
exception will not last now that ESI either has reached or is reaching the 20-year-old point.”). 
231 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, AGENDA BOOK: JUNE 2016, at 74 
(2016) [hereinafter AGENDA BOOK: JUNE 2016], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default 
/files/2016-06-standing-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YX7-NWYR]. 
232 See Meeting Minutes of April 17, 2015, supra note 130, at 3. 
233 Memorandum Regarding Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules from 
Hon. William K. Sessions, III, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3 (May 7, 2015), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-05-07-evidence_rules_report_to_standing 
_committee_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ9M-5S4P]; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (business 
records exception); FED. R. EVID. 807 (residual exception). 
234 Memorandum Regarding Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules from 
Hon. William K. Sessions, III, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 1-3 (May 7, 2016), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-05-07-evidence_rules_report_to_the_ 
standing_committee_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ6U-433V] (explaining that ancient documents 
exception is “of relatively recent vintage” and thus “abrogating the exception would not 
present the kind of serious uprooting as might exist with other rules in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence”). 
235 AGENDA BOOK: JUNE 2016, supra note 231, at 74-100 (summarizing public comments 
on amendment to Rule 803(16)). 
236 See, e.g., id. at 100 (“Richard Grant . . . opposes the elimination of the ancient 
documents hearsay exception, arguing that in cases involving latent diseases, ‘crucial 
evidence such as packing slips, purchase orders, inter-office memos and reports, shipping 
invoices, and bills of lading, amongst many other documents that cannot be properly 
authenticated under other hearsay exceptions play a significant part in litigation.’”). 
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the exception at the trial level than was evident from the reported cases.237 
Further comment suggested that the business records exception and the residual 
exception would not serve as effective alternative routes for the admission of 
hearsay previously entered through the ancient documents exception.238 In 
deference to the costs that would be imposed in such actions by abrogation, the 
Advisory Committee decided to grandfather such cases by retaining the ancient 
documents exception for all documents prepared before January 1, 1998.239 This 
amended exception continues to admit those hard copy documents created prior 
to 1998 that have been hidden away in an archive or attic and that were long 
admissible at common law while closing the door to contemporary ESI that is 
ill-suited to the original intent and assumptions inherent in the ancient 
documents exception. Thus, the lessons learned through the public comment 
process enabled the amended rule to address the explosion of ESI without 
harming cases requiring proof through hard copy documents from the 1950s, 
’60s, and ’70s.  
The most recent example of adaptation in rulemaking objectives is the 
amendment to the residual hearsay exception in Rule 807, recently adopted by 
the Supreme Court.240 The Committee first turned its attention to Rule 807 in 
response to the public comment that was received on the ancient documents 
 
237 See, e.g., id. at 84 (“Justin Shrader . . . argues that the exception is especially important 
in cases involving toxic torts and latent injuries: ‘Every asbestos trial our firm has been 
involved in has relied on FRE 803(16) to enter into evidence key historical documents to 
impute knowledge to a defendant that may otherwise be inadmissible.’”). 
238 See, e.g., id. at 89 (“David Romine . . . concludes that the business records exception is 
not a substitute because no custodian will be found for ancient documents; and the residual 
exception is not a substitute because it is disfavored by the courts.”). 
239 Id. at 74 (“In response to the public comment, the amendment was changed to limit the 
coverage of the ancient documents exception to those documents prepared before January 1, 
1998.”); FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment (“The ancient 
documents exception to the rule against hearsay has been limited to statements in documents 
prepared before January 1, 1998. The Committee has determined that the ancient documents 
exception should be limited due to the risk that it will be used as a vehicle to admit vast 
amounts of unreliable electronically stored information (ESI).”). The textual change to Rule 
803(16) is as follows: 
Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—Regardless of Whether the Declarant 
Is Available as a Witness 
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available as a witness: . . . (16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A 
statement in a document that is at least 20 years old that was prepared before January 1, 
1998, and whose authenticity is established. 
240 See Order Amending Evidence Rule 807 at 3-5, SUPREMECOURT.GOV (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frev19_774d.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CTN-
9UHF] (noting that amendment will take effect on December 1, 2019). Rule 807 allows the 
admission of hearsay under certain conditions even if the hearsay does not fit within any of 
the standard exceptions to the rule against hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
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exception.241 As noted above, the Committee anticipated that a reliable old 
document could be qualified and admitted under the residual exception in the 
absence of an ancient documents exception. But the public comment pushed 
back powerfully on the notion that the residual exception would readily admit 
such reliable old hearsay. Many public comments emphasized that Rule 807 has 
been applied so narrowly that it would not be helpful in qualifying old 
documents.242 As a result, the Committee resolved to explore ways in which the 
residual exception could be expanded to admit reliable hearsay more readily 
without overtaking the standard exceptions or creating unbridled judicial 
discretion in the admission of hearsay.243 
Making the residual exception a little broader, but not too broad, is obviously 
a challenging assignment—in effect a tightrope walk. For help in walking this 
thin line, the Committee hosted symposia focused on hearsay issues and 
reviewed over a decade of federal case law applying the residual exception.244 
The outstanding exchange at these events and this exhaustive research revealed 
that the real defect in Rule 807 was not that it was too restrictive but rather that 
many of its provisions had created unwieldy and confusing obstacles for courts 
and litigants.245 Most notably, the Committee found that the requirement that the 
guarantees of trustworthiness for a hearsay statement admitted through Rule 807 
be “equivalent” to those found in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions created a 
 
241 For a description of the amendment process for Rule 807, see generally Daniel J. Capra, 
Expanding (or Just Fixing) the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1577 (2017). 
242 See, e.g., Kay Gunderson Reeves, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Amend Federal 
Rules of Evidence 803 and 902 (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D= 
USC-RULES-EV-2015-0003-0214 [https://perma.cc/2RRU-96TN] (expressing concerns that 
Rule 807 has always been interpreted and applied narrowly, and that it “imposes greater 
burdens on proponents of evidence than does 803(16), while also granting the judge discretion 
even if those burdens are met”); Public Comments on Proposed Abrogation of Rule 803(16), 
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb= 
commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=USC-RULES-EV-2015-0003 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2019). 
243 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 21, 2016, 
at 9 [hereinafter Meeting Minutes of October 21, 2016], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/2016-10-21-evidence_rules_minutes_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/95Q3-BUN8] 
(noting Committee’s determination that “residual exception should be crafted to prohibit 
unjust and unnecessary exclusion of reliable hearsay, while also prohibiting overuse and 
unbridled judicial discretion”). 
244 See generally Conference on Possible Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 
404(b), 807, and 801(d)(1)(A), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517 (2017); Symposium on Hearsay 
Reform, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
245 The case law digests prepared by the Reporter to the Advisory Committee can be found 
in the Agenda Book for the Spring 2017 meeting. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, 




2019] POETRY IN MOTION 1927 
 
difficult and unnecessary exercise for courts.246 After substantial consideration, 
the Committee determined that Rule 807 was not in need of expansion but rather 
in need of amendment to make the Rule more user friendly.247 Thus, the ultimate 
goal of the original proposal shifted from a “liberalizing” one to one of “sound 
rulemaking” aimed at clarifying and simplifying the Rule and at resolving long-
standing conflicts concerning its application. The ability to adapt to the research, 
deliberations, public comment, and other contributions along the rulemaking 
road contributes to sound and sensible amendments that function optimally with 
existing provisions and solve problems experienced by the consumers of the 
Rules without imposing wasteful dislocation costs.248 
2. Compromise Is Not a Dirty Word 
Even when the rulemaking objective remains fixed throughout consideration 
of a potential amendment, a compromise may be required to advance an 
amendment that upsets the settled expectations of a powerful constituency. 
There are many stakeholders in the process of Evidence rulemaking. Interested 
parties include private plaintiffs and civil defendants (corporate and individual), 
criminal defendants, judges, lawyers, law professors, other lawmakers, and the 
all-important DOJ. It is a rarity that any amendment is so even-handed in its 
impact on these many constituencies that it is not opposed by at least one of 
these stakeholders. An affected stakeholder may well dig in its heels and oppose 
 
246 See Meeting Minutes of October 21, 2016, supra note 243, at 7 (“The requirement that 
the court find trustworthiness ‘equivalent’ to the circumstantial guarantees in the Rule 803 
and 804 exceptions should be deleted . . . . That standard is exceedingly difficult to apply, 
because there is no unitary standard of trustworthiness in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.”). 
247 See Minutes of the Meeting of April 21, 2017, supra note 39, at 3-11 (summarizing 
deliberations regarding proposal to amend residual exception); id. at 5 (“Although the 
Committee originally considered amendments to Rule 807 in order to expand the scope of the 
Rule and permit more liberal admission of hearsay through the residual exception, the 
Committee’s current working draft is not intended to expand the coverage of the Rule. Instead, 
the goal of the working draft is to engage in good rulemaking that assists courts in applying 
the trustworthiness standard and resolves conflicts among the courts with respect to the 
evidence to be considered in evaluating admissibility.”). 
248 There are many other instances of successful adaptation in the amendment process. For 
example, the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 was initially intended only to clarify that the 
Daubert standard applies to nonscientific as well as to scientific expert testimony. See 
Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 6-7, 1998, at 3, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/0498evidenceminutes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X65B-5DRT] (describing amendment as premised in part on clarifying that 
“[t]he trial court’s gatekeeping function should apply to all expert testimony, not only 
scientific expert testimony”). After significant exploration of the standards surrounding the 
admissibility of expert testimony, the Rule that was ultimately enacted went much further—
for example, by adding the requirements that the expert must have a sufficient basis for an 
opinion and must have reliably applied her methodology. FED. R. EVID. 702(b), (d) (requiring 
that “testimony is based on sufficient facts or data” and “expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case,” respectively). 
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any amendment that imposes burdens on its litigating position. To achieve 
resolution of problems with the existing rule, a compromise amendment may be 
the only option. While “compromise” should not be viewed as a dirty word, 
compromise amendments are rarely as clean in their application as amendments 
without limitations included to appease a concerned stakeholder. The Advisory 
Committee must always question whether a compromise necessary to achieve 
support for an amendment diminishes its effectiveness to such an extent that it 
is better to propose no amendment at all. Frequently, however, an amendment 
can be crafted to resolve difficulties with a rule while at the same time protecting 
a valuable player’s interests in the litigation process.  
The 2006 amendment to Rule 609(a)(2), governing impeachment of testifying 
witnesses with dishonesty convictions, illustrates the delicate dance involved in 
crafting a compromise amendment. Prior to the amendment, Rule 609(a)(2) 
provided for automatic impeachment of all witnesses with recent convictions 
that “involved dishonesty or false statement.”249 That language clearly 
encompassed convictions for crimes in which the elements required proof of 
lying—such as perjury or fraud. But many courts had held that Rule 609(a)(2) 
would admit other types of convictions whenever the witness had lied in 
committing the underlying crime.250 That line of authority was problematic for 
a number of reasons, the most important of which was that it led to most 
convictions being automatically admissible for impeachment. Most criminal 
conduct involves some kind of lying in the doing—even violent behavior such 
as assault and murder may involve deception of some sort. Moreover, a judge’s 
retrospective assessment of which facts ultimately led to a witness’s conviction 
in a previous trial constitutes an indeterminate inquiry, to say the least. If a 
witness was previously convicted of drug distribution, how is the trial judge to 
determine whether the jury in that prior case found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the witness acted dishonestly or made a false statement in committing the 
crime? The general verdict of guilty is obviously an insufficient indication. The 
trial judge might hold a hearing to essentially retry the prior case to determine 
whether the conviction can be “automatically” admitted. But going to great 
lengths to peer behind the curtain of a prior conviction to determine whether it 
is “automatically admissible” for impeachment is oxymoronic (if not simply 
moronic). 
The cleanest and simplest solution to this problem would have been to limit 
Rule 609(a)(2) to convictions for crimes that contain an element of false 
statement. A trial judge would have no difficulty determining the statutory 
 
249 FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 170, at 234-35 (providing Rule 609(a)(2) as it was 
before 2006 amendment). 
250 See, e.g., United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
prior smuggling conviction was not automatically admissible on its face because such activity 
does not necessarily involve misrepresentation or falsification, but that conviction could be 
automatically admitted if government presented proof that witness had actually used fraud or 
deceit in smuggling). 
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elements of a witness’s prior crime. Applying an elements rule would be truly 
“automatic”—the trial judge would be spared looking at transcripts, indictments, 
or other materials to determine whether acts of deception were alleged or found. 
And an amendment that narrowed automatic impeachment to convictions 
containing elements of falsehood would limit Rule 609(a)(2) appropriately. By 
requiring automatic admissibility of an impeaching conviction without 
balancing by the court, Rule 609(a)(2) is an outlier in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. It is the lone provision that expressly deprives the trial court of any 
discretion in determining whether evidence is admissible. When an impeaching 
conviction is found to fit within the limits of Rule 609(a)(2), a judge “must” 
admit it. As such, narrowly defining the reach of the Rule is particularly 
appropriate.251 
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee’s initial proposal was to limit Rule 
609(a)(2) to convictions for crimes containing an element of falsity. But because 
this amendment would narrow the types of convictions that would be 
“automatically” available for impeachment, the DOJ initially opposed any 
change to Rule 609(a)(2), notwithstanding the fact that an amendment would 
protect the government’s witnesses from automatic impeachment as well.252 
After significant exchange, the DOJ retreated from its position of complete 
opposition, but drew a line in the sand with respect to one type of conviction: 
obstruction of justice. Deceit or dishonesty is not a statutory element of 
obstruction of justice because that offense can be committed without any 
deception at all—for example, by threatening a witness or destroying 
evidence.253 On the other hand, many convictions for obstruction are grounded 
on dishonest conduct, such as making false statements to authorities or 
suborning perjury.254 Thus, the DOJ urged that convictions for obstruction of 
justice grounded on deceptive conduct should be automatically admissible for 
impeachment through Rule 609(a)(2) even though deception per se may not be 
a required statutory element of the offense.255 
 
251 For attacks on Rule 609(a)(2) and its automatic nature, see generally Aviva Orenstein, 
Honoring Margaret Berger with a Sensible Idea: Insisting That Judges Employ a Balancing 
Test Before Admitting the Accused’s Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), 
75 BROOK. L. REV. 1291 (2010) (advocating for balancing test over automatic admission); 
Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977 (2016) (critiquing 
impeachment of criminal defendants’ testimony through use of prior convictions). 
252 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 28, 2005, at 
8-11, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV04-2005-min.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/UB2F-ANS2] (summarizing exchange). 
253 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2012) (describing obstruction by intimidation, threats, 
persuasion, and deception). 
254 Id. 
255 See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 29-30, 2004, 
at 16-18, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV04-2004.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/Y6RD-2RNQ]; id. at 17 (noting DOJ’s concern that “certain crimes that should be 
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While a strict “elements” approach to the automatic admissibility of 
impeaching convictions under Rule 609(a)(2) presented the simplest and most 
effective solution to the liberal admission of dishonesty convictions in the 
courts, the Advisory Committee concluded that it would be unable to advance 
an amendment in the face of staunch opposition from the DOJ.256 Furthermore, 
the Committee determined that automatic admission of obstruction of justice 
convictions based on deception would not necessarily embroil trial judges in 
lengthy and indeterminate evaluations of prior trials because the centrality of the 
deceptive acts to the conviction might well be evident.257 For example, an 
obstruction of justice indictment might provide sufficient indication that proof 
of dishonest acts was fundamental to a conviction. The Committee, therefore, 
labored to craft a Rule 609(a)(2) test that would encompass obstruction of justice 
convictions based on deceptive acts or statements, but limit the existing 
problems associated with courts peering behind the veil of every conviction.258 
As a result of these efforts, the 2006 amendment to Rule 609(a)(2) provides 
for automatic impeachment of a witness with a prior conviction if a trial judge 
“can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required 
proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or false statement.”259 The 
Committee Note accompanying the amendment clarifies that Rule 609(a)(2) is 
intended to cover only those crimes in which the defendant was punished for an 
act of dishonesty or false statement, even if the statute under which he was 
convicted covers crimes other than lying-based crimes—crimes like (and 
probably limited to) obstruction of justice.260 The Note cautions against a court 
conducting a mini-trial to determine whether the crime was based on deceit or 
false statement.261 
 
included as crimina falsi would not fit under a strict ‘elements’ test,” with prime example 
being obstruction of justice). 
256 See id. at 18 (“The Committee resolved to allow the Reporter and the Department of 
Justice representatives to work on compromise language that would accomplish the goals on 
which everyone agreed.”). 
257 Id. (“The compromise would permit automatic impeachment when an element of the 
crime required proof of deceit; but it would go somewhat further and permit automatic 
impeachment if an underlying act of deceit could be ‘readily determined’ from such 
information as the charging instrument.”). 
258 Id. (“Committee members eventually agreed that the new draft captured the goals of 
the Committee in proposing an amendment to Rule 609(a)(2): it would rectify a conflict, 
prevent a mini-trial, and permit automatic admissibility for only those crimes that are 
especially probative of the witness’s character for untruthfulness.”). 
259 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
260 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“The 
amendment provides that Rule 609(a)(2) mandates the admission of evidence of a conviction 
only when the conviction required the proof of . . . an act of dishonesty or false statement.”). 
261 See id. (“The amendment requires that the proponent have ready proof that the 
conviction required the factfinder to find . . . an act of dishonesty or false statement. . . . [A] 
proponent may offer information such as an indictment, a statement of admitted facts, or jury 
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The 2006 amendment to Rule 609(a)(2) thus illustrates both the art and the 
pain of a compromise amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. On the pain 
side of the equation, compromising to achieve the support of the DOJ meant 
sacrificing the most straightforward and effective solution to the problem with 
the existing provision. An elements-only standard would have provided a bright-
line test that judges could have easily (and automatically) implemented in the 
heat of trial. On the art side of the equation, however, the resulting amendment 
to Rule 609(a)(2)—even with the obstruction of justice carve-out—resulted in a 
net benefit for the trial process, putting an end to expansive interpretation of 
“dishonesty” convictions and to time-consuming mini-trials to determine the 
admissibility of previous convictions. Compromise is a critical component of 
constructive reform that advances the Federal Rules of Evidence without 
upsetting litigants’ long-standing expectations. 
CONCLUSION 
If Evidence professors ruled the world, the Federal Rules of Evidence might 
look a lot different than they do now. They would be theoretically sound, 
completely consistent, and perfect engines of fairness, letting the chips fall 
where they may. But perhaps unfortunately (or fortunately, depending upon your 
viewpoint), Evidence professors are pretty low on the scale of important 
consumers of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead, the Rules are geared 
toward the litigants and judges who rely on them day in and day out. So, they 
need to be direct and easy to apply in the heat of trial and they need to 
accommodate both sides of an adversarial proceeding. Under these 
circumstances, rulemakers may reasonably decline to advance watershed 
changes to the Rules. But they should be expected, at least, to adapt the Rules to 
contemporary constitutional doctrine, to keep the Rules up to date with 
technological and societal advancement, to rectify conflicts in their 
interpretation, and to promote fairness in a way that balances their many 
constituencies. The principles set forth in this Article, garnered by what is almost 
a lifetime of experience in rulemaking, can hopefully be used to promote 
responsible rulemaking for the Federal Rules of Evidence and beyond. 
 
instructions to show that the factfinder had to find . . . an act of dishonesty or false statement 
in order for the witness to have been convicted.”). 
